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Abstract
The phenomenon of anthropogenic climate change requires immediate attention.
Many of the most severe effects of climate change will occur in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Least-developed countries (LDCs) in this region are particularly vulnerable to climate
change, due to their geographical location and their poor ability to cope with the
consequences. This study examines the various impacts, vulnerabilities, and adaptation
strategies associated with climate change in sub-Saharan African LDCs, using Tanzania,
Burkina Faso, and Senegal as case studies. Each of these three countries has developed a
National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA), a country-specific climate change
adaptation plan designed by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change. A number of theories on adaptation emphasize the importance of having the
capacity to adapt. Interestingly, the NAPAs do not include capacity-building in their
prioritized lists of adaptation strategies. I hypothesize that this omission can be attributed
in part to the countries’ adaptation priorities and to the countries’ low levels of extant
capacity. It may be the desire of the LDCs to create technology-based adaptation plans
that can be implemented by even their most vulnerable groups, namely poor rural
populations. Furthermore, colonial legacies and low levels of development have, in some
cases, compromised the capacity of governments to carry out the most basic and
immediate tasks. Building the capacity to respond to climate change is not always
possible for the governments of LDCs.
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I. Introduction
The world’s scientists and state leaders have finally reached a consensus that
anthropogenic climate change is a reality and that the phenomenon requires immediate
attention.1 While climate-altering gases mix uniformly in the atmosphere regardless of
the distribution of emission sources, the impacts of climate change will be far-reaching
and unequal in distribution. Future generations of all socio-economic and income levels
will feel the effects of climate change, even if greenhouse gas emissions were to be
completely cut off today, since substances such as carbon dioxide remain in the
atmosphere for an entire century.2 Currently, the atmosphere’s greenhouse gas
concentrations have exceeded the Earth’s natural range of the last 650,000 years.3
Scientists believe that a temperature rise of 2°C represents a threshold above which
further temperature increases would have catastrophic consequences.4 Therefore, despite
uncertainties regarding the exact magnitude and timing of the impacts, it is imperative
that the world address climate change immediately. The globe’s poorest populations are
already beginning to suffer from the effects of climate change. However, the countries
that suffer the most are also the least responsible for anthropogenic climate change, and
are the least able to cope with its impacts.
Poor countries are the most heavily affected by climate change and have the least
capacity to adapt. Least-developed countries (LDCs) have the world’s smallest
greenhouse gas emissions and thus have contributed the least to the climate change

1
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phenomenon.5 Ironically, the developed world – the advanced industrialized countries
with the greatest responsibility for causing anthropogenic climate change in the first place
– will not suffer nearly as much from climate change as LDCs and, additionally, have a
much greater ability to cope with the negative impacts. The developed world is therefore
in the position to assist LDCs in their adaptation endeavors, even if it is reluctant to do
so, and it is important that special attention be given to the plight of LDCs.
In this thesis, I investigate the principal climate change adaptation strategies of
LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa. I selected Africa as my area of study for two reasons: first
of all, the effects of climate change will be particularly severe in this part of the world.
Secondly, a great number of African countries are extremely poor and thus will face
particular difficulties in coping with climate change’s impacts. In response to the
especially vulnerable situation of LDCs, the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change has designed country-specific adaptation strategies, entitled National
Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs). However, capacity-building, and important
component of effective adaptation to climate change, appears to be missing from the
NAPAs’ prioritized adaptation strategies. I seek to explain the lack of capacity-building
plans, using Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Senegal as case studies. I will argue that
capacity-building is missing from the NAPAs because of the countries’ low levels of
existing capacity, and because of the countries’ colonial legacies. I first will provide a
background on climate-related vulnerabilities and the impacts of climate change on sub-

5

LDCs are a category of countries officially recognized by the United Nations and a number of other
international bodies. The three major components of the definition of and LDC are low income, weak
human resources, and economic vulnerability. UNFCCC website, “Frequently Asked Questions about
LDCs, NAPAs, and the LEG.”
<http://unfccc.int/cooperation_support/least_developed_countries_portal/frequently_asked_questions/ite
ms/4743.php>.
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Saharan Africa. I will also describe the rationale behind the NAPAs. At the end of this
chapter, I will lay out the structure of my study.
Vulnerabilities
The continent of Africa is particularly vulnerable to the negative effects of climate
change. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states this with high
confidence in its Fourth Assessment Report, adding that the climate situation in this
region is “aggravated by the interaction of ‘multiple stresses’… and low adaptive
capacity.”6 According to both the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change and the IPCC, vulnerability is “the degree to which a system is susceptible to,
and unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability
and extremes.”7 The distinction between “weather” and “climate” is also relevant:
Weather is the phenomena of wind, rain, sunshine, clouds, and temperature on a day-today basis. Climate refers to the overall or average weather conditions that prevail over the
longer term.8
Africa’s primary climate-related vulnerabilities stem from the negative impacts of
climate change on agriculture and food security, water stress, ecosystem degradation,
health risks, and weak adaptive capacity. With high confidence, the IPCC claims that
adaptation strategies implemented by African farmers are insufficient in terms of
responding to future climate change, and that “agricultural production and food
security… are likely to be severely compromised.”9 Many African countries depend
heavily on agriculture for local livelihoods and national GDP. The agricultural sector

6

IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, p. 435
IPCC Working Group II Glossary, <http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/glossary/ar4-wg2.pdf>.
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Basher et al., in Climate Change in Africa, p. 273
9
IPCC 4th Assessment Report, p. 435

7

6

comprises between 10% and 70% of the GDP of African countries.10 The Saharan region
of Africa could experience “agricultural losses of between 2 and 7% of GDP” by 2100.11
Many areas in Africa already experience agricultural challenges due to semi-arid
conditions, and climate change is projected to render marginal agricultural regions
unsuitable for cultivation.12 Prolonged droughts and floods, often attributed to climate
change, intensify other challenges to agriculture such as crop diseases, poor soil fertility,
and pests.13 Furthermore, it is likely that the changing climate will decrease the duration
of growing seasons. In certain countries, crop yields are expected to decline up to 50% in
the next twelve years.14 Small-scale farmers will be particularly negatively impacted,
with net revenues from crops falling up to 90% over the next century.15 Overall, food
security in Africa will be threatened and more Africans will suffer from hunger and
famine.
Water shortages are one of the major ways in which climate change negatively
affects human livelihood. The IPCC predicts with very high confidence that climate
change will exacerbate water stress in areas already prone to water shortages, and will
place a number of countries at risk of water stress even though they might not currently
face water issues.16 Roughly 200 million people, approximately one-quarter of Africa’s
population, already experience high water stress. This number could potentially double
by the 2020s and triple by the 2050s.17 Alterations in rainfall patterns, attributed to
climate change, can often lead to drought – a significant problem for Africans, since over
10
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a third of Africa’s population dwells in “drought-prone areas.”18 Reduced agricultural
productivity and increased susceptibility to diseases are two primary effects of drought.
The Sahel region already experiences persistent drought, and thus is particularly
vulnerable to further water shortages induced by climate change.19 “Drought affected
areas in sub-Saharan Africa could expand by 60-90 million hectares, with dry land zones
suffering losses of US$26 billion by 2060.”20 The African Sahel is especially at risk to
desertification, a climate process also influenced by rainfall patterns. The Sahelian
ecological zone actually shifted southward by roughly 30 km as a result of reduced
rainfall in the latter part of the 20th century.21 The southward spread of the desert
destroyed grassland areas as well as some flora and fauna.22
Climate change can cause significant ecosystem degradation, which negatively
affects the livelihoods of many Africans. With very high confidence, the IPCC reports
that noticeable changes are already occurring in an array of African ecosystems, “at a
faster rate than anticipated.”23 In most of Africa’s sub-Saharan countries, wood and
charcoal provide approximately 80 to 90% of the energy consumed by poor households.24
“Extreme poverty and the lack of access to other fuels mean that 80% of the overall
African population relies primarily on biomass to meet its residential needs, with this fuel
source supplying more than 80% of the energy consumed in sub-Saharan Africa.”25 This
heavy dependence on biomass adds to Africa’s vulnerability to ecosystem degradation.
Moreover, a reliance on wood-based energy sources encourages deforestation, which
18
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accelerates the degradation caused by climate change. Mountain ecosystems, notably Mt.
Kilimanjaro, are also undergoing modifications largely as a result of climate change. Mt.
Kilimanjaro’s ice cap may vanish for the first time in 11,000 years within the next two
decades.26 Disappearing ice caps will reduce water availability to neighboring
communities.
While some areas in Africa will experience severe water shortages as a result of
climate change, other regions will become increasingly endangered by flooding. With
high confidence, the IPCC predicts the inundation of coastal lands.27 Lakes and rivers
will be impacted as climate change alters rainfall patterns. Both freshwater floods and sea
water inundation compromise sanitation and the availability of potable water.28 Changes
in marine ecosystems will also contribute to the vulnerability of many African countries
to climate change. “In Africa, highly productive ecosystems (mangroves, estuaries,
deltas, coral reefs), which form the basis for important economic activities such as
tourism and fisheries, are located in the coastal zone.”29 Coastal cities contain 40% of
West Africa’s population.30 Damage to coral reefs, for instance, as a consequence of
increased temperatures and acidification of the ocean, could reduce the fish supply. Fish
are a vital source of food and revenue for many coastal African countries: for example,
over 6% of Senegal’s GDP comes from fisheries.31 Ecosystems such as mangroves
protect against erosion, indicating that the degradation of marine ecosystems could

26
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increase vulnerability to sea-level rise. Rising sea levels may also contribute to flooding,
which negatively impacts human health.
Climate change has significant implications for the health of populations in
African countries, as the IPCC states with high confidence.32 Climate change is believed
to “alter the ecology of some disease vectors in Africa, and consequently the spatial and
temporal transmission of such diseases.”33 Malaria already kills 1 million people per year,
and climate change could cause an additional 220-400 million people to be exposed to the
disease.34 The increased scope of malaria is often ascribed to the warming of
temperatures and changes in rainfall. Health stresses are not limited to disease exposure,
however; limited food supply and poor nutrition increase human vulnerability as well.
Furthermore, poor health in the present generation could have implications for
development in the future.35 Many poor countries lack the capacity to respond and adapt
to these climate-related threats.
Capacities
Africa’s vulnerability to climate change is compounded by the weak adaptive
capacities of its countries. The continent’s low level of development restricts its capacity
to respond to the effects of a changing climate. Studies have shown that “sub-Saharan
Africa is the only region in the world that has become poorer in this generation.”36 This
poverty can in part be explained by diminishing food security, decreasing real wealth,
lack of economic growth, poor education, and the spread of HIV/AIDS.37 Public services,
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such as healthcare or response to an environmental disaster, often are impeded by poorly
designed and implemented policies.38 Many institutional and legal frameworks in African
countries are inadequate for addressing climate challenges such as ecosystem
degradation, droughts, and floods. Lack of access to technology, infrastructure,
information, and markets also create barriers to adaptation.39 For example, “Africa has
been described as the world’s great laggard in technological advance in the area of
agriculture,” and consequently many countries experience heightened climate change
vulnerability due to inefficient irrigation technologies.40 Environmental degradation and
climate vulnerability are intensified by poor infrastructure and limited technology, as well
as a dependence on natural resource extraction for energy, shelter, clean water, and
food.41 African LDCs struggle to respond to climate-related vulnerabilities.
In order for countries to adapt to the effects of climate change, they must have the
capacity to do so. Adaptation involves both responding to the negative impacts of climate
change and adjusting accordingly. In this context, responding implies acknowledging the
effects of climatic change, whereas adjusting consists of making changes in order to cope
with the climatic changes. A country’s capacity is its ability or potential to generate a
response and make the necessary adjustments.42 Studies suggest that institutions,
knowledge, and technology are significant components of the capacity to adapt.
Knowledge and understanding of climate vulnerabilities are required in order to plan an
effective adaptation strategy. Technology enables policy-makers to gather sufficient
information about a problem, and also forms the basis of many adaptation plans.
38
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Institutions, at both the international and domestic levels, play a significant role in
generating and implementing adaptation policies. In this study, I use the term “capacity”
to refer to state capacity. State capacity has technical, intellectual, participatory,
administrative, and political components. Technical and intellectual capacities are
required for identifying adaptation needs and developing appropriate policy responses.
Participatory capacity is important in order for stakeholders to have a voice in the
decision-making process; and administrative or political capacity is necessary for the
implementation of adaptation strategies.
Effective adaptation to climate change is necessary even with the implementation
of strict climate change mitigation measures. Greenhouse gases remain in the atmosphere
for a century; thus, the world has committed itself to the consequences of climate change
well into the future. As demonstrated, poor African countries will be the hardest hit by
climate change’s impacts. African LDCs suffer from an array of climate-related
vulnerabilities and lack the capacity to adapt – in fact, many even lack the capacity
required to generate an effective adaptation plan. Therefore, the international community
must provide assistance in the adaptation arena.43 While rich countries have been
reluctant to cut down on fossil fuel consumption, the world’s wealthiest have begun to
perceive that adapting to climate change is a necessity. Since the wealthy nations have
the means to adapt, they are able to provide adaptive aid to those with “far more severe
adaptation challenges.”44 One way in which the developed world has responded to the
plight of LDCs is by facilitating climate change adaptation plans.

43
44
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National Adaptation Programs of Action
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in
effect since March of 1994, has addressed the adaptation needs of LDCs by developing
an agenda for National Adaptation Programs of Action (NAPAs).45 According to the
UNFCCC, the entire “rationale for developing NAPAs rests on the low adaptive capacity
of LDCs”46 These country-specific documents, developed by LDCs with guidance from
the UNFCCC, are designed to facilitate immediate adaptation to the countries’ most
urgent climate-related vulnerabilities.47 In Article 4 of the Convention, the UNFCCC
officially recognizes the “specific needs and special situations” of LDCs in terms of
adapting to climate change.48 In the 7th Conference of Parties (COP), the UNFCCC
acknowledged that LDCs lack the capacity to adapt, as a result of vulnerability,
widespread poverty, and poor human, infrastructural, and economic conditions.49
Therefore, a number of international actors must provide adaptation assistance. The
UNFCCC placed the Global Environment Facility (GEF)50 in charge of activities such as
improving data collection, analysis, and dissemination, providing specialized technical
training, establishing and strengthening research centers, supporting climate change
education, promoting technology transfers, and enhancing capacity.51 A climate change

45

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change website, “Essential Background”
UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties, Volume IV, Decision
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UNFCCC website, “Essential Background,” 4.9
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50
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multilateral environmental agreements or conventions; as such the GEF assists countries in meeting their
obligations under the conventions.” GEF website, “What is the GEF?”
51
UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its tenth session,
Decision 5/CP.7, pp. 33-35
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fund and/or adaptation fund is designed to provide support for the prompt implementation
adaptation activities, monitoring climate-affected disease vectors, forecasting of severe
weather events, and building capacity.52 However, the GEF and the climate
change/adaptation fund are simply mechanisms designed to facilitate compliance with the
UNFCCC, and do not play a significant role in terms of NAPA development.
As a further response to the specific situation of LDCs, the UNFCCC established
an LDC work program, intended in part to support NAPA preparation.53 The work
program addresses the LDCs’ inability to convey their “urgent and immediate needs in
respect of their vulnerability and adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change.”54
The information contained in NAPAs “would help to build capacity” for responding to
these needs. The UNFCCC, therefore, sets out NAPA development guidelines. NAPAs
should be easily-comprehensible, country-driven and action-oriented, and should
prioritize the LDCs’ most pressing adaptation needs.55 Specific guiding elements include
a participatory process, a country-driven approach, a multidisciplinary approach, a
complementary approach taking into account extant programs, sustainable development,
gender equality, sound environmental management, cost-effectiveness, simplicity, and
flexibility.56
The NAPA preparation process consists of setting up a national NAPA team
“composed of a lead agency and representatives of stakeholders including government
52

UNFCCC Addendum, Part Two: Action taken by the Conference of the Parties at its tenth session,
Decision 5/CP.7, pp. 35-36
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agencies and civil society.”57 This team, in turn, assembles a group to compile
information on the effects of climate change and coping strategies, to carry out a
participatory vulnerability assessment, to identify crucial adaptation measures, and to
identify and prioritize criteria for the selection of specific activities.58 A consultative
process generates adaptation ideas, and the national NAPA team turns these ideas into
adaptation activities. Evaluating the proposed activities with the specified criteria yields a
prioritized list of the most important adaptation activities. Following a specific,
UNFCCC-designed format, the NAPA team then creates profiles of the priority activities.
Profiles include a title, rationale, description (objectives, inputs, short- and long-term
outcomes), and implementation strategy (involved institutions, risks, evaluation, financial
resources, etc.).59 Next, the document is reviewed by the public and revised if necessary,
and a final review is conducted by a team of representatives from both government and
civil society. Finally, after endorsement by the national government, the NAPA is
disseminated to the public and to the UNFCCC secretariat.60
The UNFCCC also suggests a structure for the NAPA document. An introduction
should include relevant country-specific background information. A framework for the
adaptation program should give an overview of the present and future negative impacts of
climate change, how the NAPA relates to the country’s existing development goals, and

57
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possible obstacles in implementing the NAPA.61 The next section should identify vital
adaptation needs and pinpoint relevant adaptation strategies (such as policy reform and
capacity building). Then, the NAPA should set out its criteria for the selection of priority
activities. While it is ultimately up to the LDC to develop its own list of criteria, the
UNFCCC proposes that the criteria include “level or degree of adverse effects of climate
change; poverty reduction to enhance adaptive capacity; synergy with other multilateral
environmental agreements; and cost-effectiveness.”62 The criteria should apply to a
number of sectors, such as health, agriculture, water, infrastructure, land-use
management, and coastal zones.63 Finally, the document should contain the profiles of the
selected priority activities.
An LDC expert group (LEG) has been established by the UNFCCC in order to
provide LDCs with advice on preparing and implementing their NAPAs. This includes
technical advice for identifying data and advice on the “capacity-building needs for LDCs
in support of the preparation and implementation of NAPAs.”64 The UNFCCC intends
that the LEG be comprised of twelve competent experts. Five of the experts should be
from African LDCs, two from Asian LDCs, two from Small Island Developing State
LDCs, and three Annex II countries.65 Therefore, the members of the LEG appropriately
represent the regions of the world where adaptation needs are greatest.

61
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NAPAs ideally will lead to long-term adaptation to the effects of climate change.
One would assume, therefore, that these documents would be designed to increase all the
major types of capacity required for effective adaptation. However, while the NAPA
development process attempts to incorporate knowledge from a range of international,
national, and local experts and stakeholders, and while the NAPA documents tend to
prioritize technology-based adaptation, the NAPAs do not include specific plans for
increasing state capacity. Many scholars believe that state capacity is an important
component of adaptation.66 In multiple instances, the UNFCCC mentions the need for
capacity. It is curious, then, that the NAPAs that I have investigated appear to lack
capacity-building plans.
Case Studies
Using three Sub-Saharan African LDCs as case studies, I investigate the role of
capacity in the NAPAs, and attempt to explain why state capacity-building seems to be
missing from the NAPAs’ prioritized adaptation plans. Burkina Faso, Senegal, and
Tanzania provide interesting case studies. These countries experience a range of climaterelated vulnerabilities and have all developed NAPAs. All three countries have signed
and ratified the Kyoto Protocol, a binding climate change agreement related to the
UNFCCC, and belong to the non-Annex I group, meaning that, unlike the advanced
industrialized countries, they are not obligated to reduce their greenhouse gas emissions.
While Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Tanzania clearly fit into the category of LDCs in SubSaharan Africa, their differing circumstances in terms of economic diversity, natural
resources, and level of development lead to variations in their vulnerabilities and

66
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examined in the following chapter.

17

capacities to adapt, and make them useful countries to investigate. Because the countries
experience different sets of climate-related vulnerabilities and have different levels of
existing state capacity, a comparison of the three countries helps to provide insight as to
why the NAPAs do not prioritize capacity-building adaptation plans. Burkina Faso is the
most resource-poor out of the three, Tanzania has the most corrupt government, and
Senegal has maintained the closest relationship with its former colonizer.
Tanzania ranks 159th out of 177 countries in the Human Development Index,
between Burkina Faso and Senegal.67 The life expectancy is 51.0 years, lower than either
Burkina Faso or Senegal. However, the adult literacy rate is 69.468 - much higher than
either of the other countries. Like Senegal, Tanzania is a coastal country. Other
noteworthy geographic features include Lake Victoria and Mount Kilimanjaro. Like both
Burkina Faso and Senegal, emission levels are lower than average for Sub-Saharan
Africa; though Tanzania contains 0.6% of the global population, average per capita
carbon dioxide emissions are only 0.1 tons. Tanzania accounts for 0.0% of the world’s
emissions. To compare, OECD countries comprise 15% of the global population and
account for nearly 50% of global emissions.69
Burkina Faso is the only landlocked country out of the three. It is also the poorest
and least developed. Ranked 176th out of 177 countries in the Human Development
Index, the country’s level of poverty is below the average for Sub-Saharan Africa as a
whole.70 With a population of 13 million,71 life expectancy is 51.4 years, and only 23.6
percent of adults are literate. The economy of Burkina Faso depends heavily on cotton
67
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exports and is considerably less diversified than Senegal or Tanzania’s economies.
Burkina Faso has fewer natural resources than the other two countries, and receives
minimal rainfall.72 In terms of climate change, Burkina Faso’s emission levels are lower
than the average for Sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, “with 0.2% of the world’s
population, Burkina Faso accounts for 0.0% of global emissions – an average of 0.1 tons
of CO2 per person.”73 In comparison, in 2004 the United States had per capita carbon
dioxide emissions of 20.6 tons.74
Senegal, a country of 10.8 million inhabitants,75 ranks 156th out of 177 countries
in the Human Development Index.76 This HDI ranking is the highest of the three
countries studied. Located on a coast, Senegal has more natural resources than Burkina
Faso. Groundnuts, the chemical industry, services, tourism, and fisheries dominate the
Senegalese economy, which more diversified than the economies of Burkina Faso or
Tanzania.77 Senegal’s GDP growth rates have been higher than average for Sub-Saharan
Africa. Life expectancy is 62.3 years – a considerably higher value than for the other two
countries. 39.3 percent of adults are literate, more than in Burkina Faso but less than in
Tanzania. Like Burkina Faso, Senegal accounts for 0.0% of the world’s carbon dioxide
emissions. Senegal comprises 0.2% of the global population, and emits on average 0.4
tons of carbon dioxide per inhabitant, a slightly higher per capita emission level than that
of Burkina Faso or Tanzania.
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As shown by their emission levels, Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Senegal make
negligible contributions to climate change. Though the LDCs are not responsible for
creating anthropogenic climate change, they are extremely vulnerable to its negative
effects. Agriculture and livestock involve a huge percentage of the populations of the
three countries, and these sectors are particularly susceptible to climate change impacts
such as rainfall variability. Tanzania and Senegal also depend on their fishing industries,
but sea-level rise, changes in water temperature, and coastal erosion threaten this means
of livelihood. The need for adaptation is increasingly urgent, and the UNFCCC-designed
NAPAs are intended to set forth effective adaptation plans.
Strategies to increase state capacity – a crucial component of adaptation,
according to many scholars – appear to be missing from the NAPA documents. In this
thesis, I explore reasons for why capacity-building is not a prominent component of the
prioritized adaptation strategies. I conduct an assessment of how capacity fits into the
NAPAs of the three case study countries. I also examine the climate-related
vulnerabilities as perceived by the LDCs themselves and the country’s existing levels of
capacity. I pay particular attention to the countries’ existing state capacity as an
explanation for the omission of capacity-building adaptation plans. In addition, I will
investigate the specific vulnerabilities of Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Tanzania, and how
well the countries are addressing these vulnerabilities in their NAPAs. I had also planned
to examine the advisory role of the UNFCCC, and to look at whether the advice provided
by the UNFCCC discouraged the integration of capacity-building plans; however, I
elected not to continue this particular investigation, as my initial findings suggested that
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the advisory role of the UNFCCC did not in fact influence the capacity-building content
of the NAPAs.
I begin my study with a theoretical chapter on capacity and the NAPAs. I define
capacity, explain the need for capacity, and outline scholarly theories on capacitybuilding in terms of adaptation to climate change. In this chapter, I also introduce my
hypotheses and explain my methodology. I will argue that capacity-building plans have
been omitted from the prioritized lists in the NAPAs of Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and
Senegal for two principal reasons: One, the countries themselves lack the capacity to
implement capacity-building adaptation strategies. Two, as a result of colonial legacies,
governments lack the capacity to even develop capacity-building plans. To test these
hypotheses, I will analyze the NAPA content, the climate-related vulnerabilities, and the
historical background of each country. I use the Environmental Sustainability Index as a
measure of existing capacity.
After the theoretical chapter, I include a chapter for each of the three case study
countries. In the first case study chapter, on Tanzania, I illustrate the NAPA development
process in detail. I show that Tanzania’s NAPA follows the UNCCC’s guidelines,
addresses a number of the country’s climate-related vulnerabilities, and yet fails to
include any capacity-building plans. Tanzania’s low level of existing state capacity
explains this omission. The colonial legacy appears to have contributed to the poor ability
of the government to function. In the following chapter, I explore the severity of Burkina
Faso’s climate situation. I also demonstrate that, while the NAPA matches up with the
structure proposed by the UNFCCC, the country makes no mention of capacity-building
in its list of prioritized adaptation strategies. Like Tanzania, Burkina Faso has a weak
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government and suffers from a rough colonial history. Senegal is somewhat different
from the other two countries, even though it experiences almost the exact same climaterelated vulnerabilities as Tanzania. Like the other countries, Senegal’s NAPA does not
include capacity-building in its final list of priority adaptation activities. However, this
NAPA pays much greater attention to the need for capacity than the other NAPAs in this
study. Senegal appears to have a greater amount of existing state capacity than Burkina
Faso or Tanzania. Furthermore, Senegal experienced a smooth transition to independence
and maintained a close relationship with its former colonizer.
Overall, I will argue that capacity-building plans have not been included in the
NAPAs’ prioritized adaptation activities because of low state capacity and, in some cases,
colonial legacy. In all three countries – and in sub-Saharan LDCs in general – poor, rural
populations are the groups the most vulnerable to climate change. These groups would
likely be unable to implement adaptation plans that have a capacity-building focus, and
those responsible for the development of NAPAs might have purposely selected priority
activities that the most vulnerable groups would be able to execute. Tanzania and Burkina
Faso have extremely low levels of state capacity; the poorly-functioning governments
struggle to provide even the most basic services, and are unable to develop capacitybuilding plans. Likewise, both of these countries have faced governmental difficulties
ever since their independence from colonial rule. Senegal, on the other hand, has enjoyed
relatively stable and effective governance – in part thanks to a positive colonial legacy.
Consequently, the Senegalese government seems to have a higher level of state capacity
than the other two cases, and Senegal’s NAPA demonstrates a greater awareness of the
need for capacity-building.
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II. Capacity-Building and Adaptation from a Theoretical Perspective
Most theorists agree that state capacity is an important factor in increasing a
country’s ability to adapt to the effects of climate change. However, the National
Adaptation Programs of Action of least-developed countries in Sub-Saharan Africa do
not seem to consider capacity building to be a priority. The United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, the institution backing the NAPA preparation process,
recognizes that LDCs lack the capacity to adapt to climate change, and sometimes even
lack the capacity to communicate their climate-related vulnerabilities and needs.78 Why,
then, have countries failed to include specific plans for capacity-building in the NAPA
documents’ prioritized lists of adaptation activities? An examination of climate-related
vulnerabilities, NAPA content, and country characteristics leads to two major hypotheses
for why this may be the case. The hypotheses concentrate on the African LDCs’ own
perceptions of vulnerabilities to climate change and the countries’ developmental
situation. Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Senegal provide useful case studies with which to
test these hypotheses.
This chapter includes explanations of the approach behind NAPA development,
capacity-building, my hypotheses, and methodology. The NAPAs are intended to follow
a country-driven, bottom-up approach, indicating that each individual LDC is responsible
for developing its own climate change adaptation plans. Definitions and theories on
capacity-building demonstrate the need for capacity in order to adapt to climate change.
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Colonial history and indicators from the Environmental Sustainability Index and the
Human Development Report provide a picture of each country’s level of development,
including state capacity. In particular, I use education, social and institutional capacity,
and scientific and technical capacity as indicators of state capacity. In light of the NAPA
approach, the importance of capacity, and the low level of existing capacity in LDCs, I
develop hypotheses to explain why the NAPAs do not contain adaptation strategies that
focus on capacity-building.
The NAPA Approach
In 2001, the seventh Conference of Parties acknowledged that LDCs have a
unique situation and lack the capability to cope with the challenges of adapting to the
negative effects of climate change.79 In response to this recognition, the UNFCCC
established an LDC work program and initiated the development of National Adaptation
Programs of Action (NAPAs). The NAPA documents are designed to “prioritize urgent
adaptation needs” and to “draw on existing information and community-level input” in
order to pinpoint adaptation projects that will allow countries to deal with the immediate
impacts of climate change.80 The UNFCCC reasons that since LDCs have such
constricted abilities to adapt, the most appropriate step forward is a new approach
designed specifically for these types of countries. The intention is that NAPAs will
“focus on enhancing capacity to adapt to climate variability, which itself [will] help
address the adverse affects of climate change.”81 In the previous chapter, I explained the
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specific guidelines and frameworks set forth by the UNFCCC for the preparation of the
NAPA documents.
The NAPA programs should consider strategies to cope with climate change that
already exist at local levels, and should use these strategies as the starting points for the
identification of priority activities.82 The alternative would be a top-down approach that
begins with scenario-based modeling and looks at future vulnerabilities and long-term
national policies, which would be less effective in addressing urgent present-day needs –
“those for which further delay could increase vulnerability or lead to increased costs at a
later stage.”83 The NAPA process gives a high degree of prominence to community-level
input because communities often are the main stakeholders and have local information
that could be valuable in greater contexts.84 Furthermore, the UNFCCC believes that a
bottom-up, country-driven approach is the best option because it ensures that states have
an active interest in following through with their adaptation plans.85 If a wide range of
stakeholders participate in the NAPA preparation process, then the final document should
reflect what the country as a whole perceives to be its principal adaptation needs.
Everyone involved, from the national government to local communities, should be
motivated to implement the adaptation efforts. However, capacity is required in order for
successful adaptation to occur. Given the bottom-up, participatory nature of NAPA
development, I investigate country-level explanations for why the NAPAs do not include
capacity-building plans. Do the NAPAs lack capacity-building because of the country’s
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own perceptions of vulnerabilities to climate change? Are the countries simply unable to
develop capacity-building plans because they lack the state capacity to do so?
Definitions
In order to understand the importance of building adaptation capacity in
vulnerable countries, it is helpful to be familiar with the terminology. Definitions of
capacity distinguish between capacity-building and adaptation capacity. The IPCC
describes adaptation capacity as “the ability of a system to adjust to climate change
(including climate variability and extremes), to moderate potential damages, to take
advantages of opportunities, or to cope with consequences.”86 The UNFCCC defines
capacity-building as “the process of developing technical skills and institutional
capability in developing countries and economies in transition to enable them to address
effectively the causes and results of climate change.”87 In this report, I concentrate on
capacity-building, with a focus on the capability to adapt to the adverse effects of climate
change. The technical skills and institutional capabilities required for a country to adapt
to climate change include technology and expertise to determine appropriate policy
responses; the ability of stakeholders (including communities and local NGOs) to
participate in decision-making; and administrative and legal frameworks to develop,
implement, and enforce new policies.88 Overall, I will use the term “state capacity” to
refer to this type of capacity to adapt, including technical/intellectual capacity for
appropriate policy development; the capacity for participation in decision-making; and
political/administrative capacity for policy implementation.
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The Need for Capacity
Climate-related hazards such as droughts, floods, and severe storms affect
millions of Africans annually.89 African LDCs experience a number of stresses that
exacerbate the impacts of climate change, including poverty, infectious disease, fragile
environments, unsustainable development, and limited institutional capacities.90 Disaster
risk reduction theory suggests three major activity areas: risk assessment, risk
management practices, and the implementation. Well-designed policies and institutional
competence are required for assessment and management activities to be carried out.91
These activities would benefit efforts to adapt to the effects of climate change. Building
the capacity to respond to climatic variability should be part of a country’s adaptation
strategies. “Adaptation initiatives need to be developed on a frank assessment of the real
problems faced in Africa and should be targeted at decision processes that have long-term
implications, for example, in respect to land use legislation, urban planning and public
infrastructure.”92 Strategies to deal with future climatic variability should begin with
building capacity to tackle current climatic variability. The NAPAs of Tanzania, Burkina
Faso, and Senegal do not include specific capacity-building projects of this nature.
Some African countries, including LDCs, have voiced their desire to increase the
capacities that they require in order to “effectively implement their commitments under
the [UNFCCC].”93 This capacity-building consists of networking and information
sharing, developing human resources, and strengthening institutions.94 Although
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implementing the UNFCCC is different from implementing a well-designed NAPA,
many of the capacity requirements overlap. Assessments of climate-related vulnerabilities
and adaptation strategies involve a number of socio-economic sectors, including water
resources, agriculture, forestry, coastal zones, and human health.95 Academic, scientific,
technical and research institutions, as well as non-governmental organizations, are of key
importance. Vulnerability and adaptation assessments require extensive data collection
and analysis, and sometimes involve the use of computer modeling and other advanced
technologies. Sharing information and expertise can facilitate the analysis process. It is
also important to improve the capacity for incorporating climate change policies into
national development plans, for policy-making, and for linking policy and science.96
Scholarly theories on capacity-building
Scholars put forth varying theories about how best to increase a country’s
capacity to adapt to climate change. Barbara Connolly focuses largely on political
capacity. She argues that increasing the political capacity of local environmental NGOs is
a highly effective way to promote the environmental concern necessary for successful
adaptation.97 NGOs often are able to inspire self-interest among local communities and
governments, and thus encourage a country to develop adaptation initiatives.
Furthermore, increasing a country’s political capacity can reduce the country’s
dependence on external support.98 International organizations can help to enhance a
country’s political capacity by increasing the effectiveness of financial transfers in areas
where capacity and concern intersect. For instance, financial transfers can build a
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country’s capability to implement environmental reforms.99 Sustained financial aid helps
cover the costs of maintaining environmental programs, “by funding technical assistance
to create long-term mechanisms, providing seed money, or incorporating conditionality
lending to reforms that will yield sustainable revenues.”100 However, NAPAs are not
likely to propose adaptation strategies that require exterior financial transfers, because of
their country-driven nature.
Connolly emphasizes several major lines of inquiry regarding aid and capacitybuilding: identification of missing capacity, self-interest of the institution that provides
the aid, and the recipient country’s level of concern.101 Increasing the effectiveness of aid
programs depends on correctly identifying the missing form and location of capacity.
Providing aid solely to increase a government’s technical capacity may be ineffective if
the country lacks the political and administrative capacities required to implement new
technology-focused policies.102 Although the NAPAs do not involve external aid,
Connolly’s theory is relevant here because many LDCs, such as Tanzania and Burkina
Faso, have poorly functioning governments that are sometimes incapable of carrying out
basic tasks of the nation-state, never mind implementing climate change strategies.
Connolly also theorizes that even if an aid-providing institution is able to discern
the appropriate type of capacity required by the recipient country, the institution’s own
self-interests may stand in its way.103 This statement can also apply to the need for
cooperation between the different government ministries that are implicated in NAPA
implementation. Additionally, it is helpful if the involved actors have a real interest in
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building capacity to adapt to climate change impacts; “interventions to augment recipient
capacity are especially profitable in areas where capacity and concern are mutually
reinforcing.”104 For exterior capacity-building aid to be most beneficial, the recipient
country must be genuinely concerned about its vulnerabilities and therefore eager to
increase its adaptation efforts once its capacities have been improved.105 A lack of
concern could be more of a constraint than a lack of capacity; aid to generate capacity is
unlikely to lead to adaptation if the country is not motivated to act. Likewise, adaptation
plans proposed by the NAPAs are more likely to be successful if the country’s citizens
are motivated to respond to climate-related vulnerabilities.
Robert Keohane stresses the importance of a high level of concern within a
country receiving aid to enhance its capacity to adapt to the effects of climate change.
Similar to Connolly’s argument, Keohane believes that if a lack of capacity is the main
constraint and concern is high, providing capacity-building aid may lead to greater efforts
by the country involved.106 Building capacity is difficult even if a recipient country has a
strong desire to adapt to climate change, as the NAPAs suggest. Keohane mentions that,
in the situation of exterior capacity-building aid, donor institutions often face significant
challenges that have nothing to do with the recipient country’s level of concern.
According to Keohane, sovereignty issues and poor strategies on the part of
international institutions constitute the chief obstacles to effective capacity-building.
International institutions often are not authorized to enforce rules within jurisdiction of
sovereign states. Since these institutions – primarily the UNFCCC and the GEF, in terms
of adapting to the effects of climate change – usually are unable to carry out large scale
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projects on their own, they must rely on national governments or domestic NGOs to
implement their recommendations and to ensure that the aid is used properly. Therefore,
the capacity of the recipient country is crucial.107 Sometimes international institutions try
to find problems in LDCs that match formerly-proposed solutions, instead of developing
new solutions for country-specific problems. However, even if an institution provides the
appropriate type of aid to enhance capacity, it may have little effect “if the fundamental
issue is a lack of concern.”108 As Connolly points out, aid will likely be much more
effective if the recipient country has a strong desire to adapt.
Keohane builds upon his theory in collaboration with Marc Levy and Peter Haas.
The three scholars underline the value of technical capacity in addition to concern.
National governments require technical capacity in order to develop appropriate policies
or regulations that take into account “both the environmental realities and the political
and economic incentives facing governments, firms, and other organizations that can
affect outcomes.”109 Even with pressure from international and domestic organizations,
governments at both national and local levels sometimes lack the capacity to implement
policy change. If an LDC does not have sufficient technical capacity, the government
may be “technically ignorant” and thus less able develop effective adaptation strategies.
Even if non-governmental actors proposed the adaptation strategies, “technically
ignorant” governments might be unable to evaluate the costs and benefits of these
plans.110 In the case of the NAPAs, the NAPA teams require technical capacity to carry
out their vulnerability assessments and to evaluate proposed priority activities. Keohane,
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Levy, and Haas believe that technical capacity is generally necessary in order to come up
with appropriate policy responses. However, once “regulations have been specified and
agreed upon, the burden of action shifts to national responses, which are often inhibited
by low political and administrative capacity.”111 Therefore, a country requires strong
capacities in a variety of areas in order to develop and implement adaptation strategies.
The three scholars state that international institutions can increase technical,
political, and administrative capacities in LDCs through a number of mechanisms. In
terms of adaptation to climate change, the UNFCCC is an institution that could
potentially enhance capacity in LDCs through its advisory role in the NAPA preparation
process. As “vehicles for transferring skills and expertise, and for empowering domestic
actors,”112 institutions provide capacity-building aid by sharing norms, technology, and
information.113 The spread of international norms, rules, and principles sets in motion
conditions for state capacity-building and policy implementation.114 Often, the
internalization of norms and principles precedes the adoption of binding rules. A country
is more likely to adhere to new regulations if the regulations reflect existing values. It is
also important for a government to already have the capacity to develop and enforce
appropriate policies before rules are implemented. While NAPAs are not binding, states
might be more likely to prioritize certain adaptation strategies if these strategies fit into
existing national norms. Ensuring that the NAPAs reflect national norms and community
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practices is part of the rationale behind the UNFCCC-recommended country-driven
approach.
Keohane, Levy, and Haas have categorized the capacity-building efforts of
international institutions into three general areas: increasing concern, enhancing the
contractual environment, and building national capacity.115 In the first category,
institutions reveal direct and indirect linkages of issues, compile and distribute scientific
information, and generate opportunities to intensify domestic pressure on policymakers.116 The UNFCCC fits into this category through its role in the NAPA
development process. By encouraging all LDCs to develop a NAPA, the UNFCCC has
increased concern in respect to climate-related vulnerabilities. Additionally, the
UNFCCC has recommended that each NAPA include a section that explains the linkages
between the NAPA and existing national environment/development programs – thus, the
UNFCCC contributes to issue linkage. Secondly, institutions are able to provide
negotiation arenas that both reduce transaction costs and facilitate the decision-making
process, monitor environmental quality, policy, and performance, and increase
accountability. Lastly, international institutions can increase national capacity by building
interorganizational networks to share technical and management expertise, transfer
financial assistance and policy-relevant information, and strengthen domestic
bureaucratic power.117 The UNFCCC has not significantly contributed to increasing the
capacity of LDCs, since the NAPA is intended to be completely developed and carried
out by the individual countries themselves . Overall, theorists argue that international
institutions can play a major role in building the capacities of LDCs to adapt to the
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impacts of climate change, and also argue that technical, political, and administrative
capacities are required for effective adaptation.
Hypotheses and selection of case studies
Connolly, Keohane, Levy, and Haas all believe that international institutions can
assist LDCs in their endeavors to build the capacity necessary for adaptation to climate
change, and that the recipient country must have a high level of concern if capacitybuilding aid is to be effective. Connolly emphasizes the need to build political capacity,
whereas Keohane, Levy, and Haas stress the importance of technical capacity. The fact
that African LDCs have developed NAPAs indicates that they are concerned about their
ability to adapt to the effects of climate change, yet the NAPA documents make very
little mention of building state capacity, including technical/intellectual capacity and
political/administrative capacity. In several instances, the NAPAs list the institutional
actors who will be responsible for implementing specific adaptation programs. Senegal’s
NAPA even cites lack of capacity as a principle obstacle to adaptation.118 Nevertheless,
none of the countries’ NAPAs propose specific adaptation plans designed to build
capacity. Using Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Tanzania as case studies, I will explore the
following hypotheses to explain why this might have occurred: (1) African LDCs,
particularly poor, rural populations, lack the capacity to implement capacity-building
adaptation plans. The countries’ highest priorities are adaptation strategies that even the
most vulnerable populations are able to implement;119 and (2) as a result of colonial
legacies, some LDC governments simply lack the capacity to design capacity-building
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plans.120 In the beginning stages of this study, I also hypothesized that the UNFCCCdesigned process for creating the NAPAs is too action-oriented to include relatively
passive adaptation strategies such as capacity-building. Therefore, I had speculated that
NAPAs might not contain capacity-building because international advising institutions
are not leading them in that direction.121 However, my initial research yielded results that
contradicted this hypothesis, and I did not explore the hypothesis further.
Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Senegal make valuable case studies for several
reasons. They are all LDCs in sub-Saharan Africa, one of the world’s most vulnerable
regions to climate change. While Senegal and Tanzania are located on coasts, and while
Tanzania has Mount Kilimanjaro and Lake Victoria, Burkina Faso is landlocked and
extremely arid; geographic characteristics might influence a country’s vulnerabilities and
its capacity to adapt. Senegal has a higher level of development than the other two
countries, which likely has a positive effect on its capacity-building prospects. All three
countries have developed NAPAs over the past several years. Overall, the primary
similarities of the three NAPAs include the basic structure and the prioritization of
adaptation plans addressing agriculture. The documents open with a country background,
an overview of the NAPA development process, the objectives of the NAPA, and the
project selection and prioritization criteria. A section in each NAPA demonstrates the
linkages between the NAPA and existing sustainable development programs. The
documents also identify the climate-related vulnerabilities of each main societal structure
or geographic zone. At the end of the document, the profiles of the top-priority adaptation
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projects are listed. These profiles include a justification of the project, objectives,
anticipated outcomes, the costs of specific activities, and a list of the institutions that will
play a role in the project’s implementation. Slight differences between the NAPAs are
found in the amount of detail of specific activities in the project profiles, the criteria for
the selection and prioritization of projects, and the inclusion of a section on potential
barriers to implementation.
To test my hypotheses, I first carry out an investigation of the climate-related
vulnerabilities of each of the three countries. I examine the NAPAs in the context of the
scholarly theories, looking for mentions of capacity-building, and I investigate how well
the NAPAs addressed the countries’ vulnerabilities to the effects of climate change. In
order to gain an understanding of existing state capacity, I investigate the political and
economic situations of the case study countries. Historical backgrounds and indicators
from the Environmental Sustainability Index are particularly valuable tools for measuring
state capacity. I will demonstrate that the lack of capacity-building in the NAPAs
corresponds to low levels of state capacity, which in turn can be explained by colonial
legacies.
Methodology
The 2005 Environmental Sustainability Index (ESI) provides a useful tool with
which to measure environmental sustainability, vulnerability, and capacity to adapt. The
ESI consists of five broad categories, which are divided into twenty-one uniformlyweighted indicators and then further broken down into seventy-six data sets. Higher
degrees of specification allow one to more accurately gauge an individual country’s
capacity and environmental situation. In terms of examining a country’s capacity-
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building potential, the Reducing Human Vulnerability and Social and Institutional
Capacity categories provide the most useful information.
The indicators in the Reducing Human Vulnerability category are Environmental
Health, Basic Human Sustenance, and Reducing Environment-Related Natural Disaster
Vulnerability. Data sets for Environmental Health measure the death rate from intestinal
infectious diseases, the child death rate from respiratory diseases, and child mortality per
1,000 live births. The most relevant data sets under Basic Human Sustenance are
percentage of undernourished in total population, and percentage of population with
access to improved drinking water source. Reducing Environment-Related Natural
Disaster Vulnerability data sets incorporate the average number of deaths per million
inhabitants from floods, tropical cyclones and droughts, and the Environmental Hazard
Exposure Index.122
The Social and Institutional Capacity category includes Environmental
Governance, Eco-Efficiency, and Science and Technology. Several of the data sets for
the Environmental Governance indicator are corruption measure, government
effectiveness, percentage of total land area under protected status, local Agenda 21
initiatives per million people, civil and political liberties, knowledge creation in
environmental science, technology and policy; and democracy measure. Eco-efficiency
data sets measure energy efficiency, and hydropower and renewable energy production as
a percentage of total energy consumption. Data sets for the Science and Technology
indicator include an innovation index, a digital access index, female primary education
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completion rate, gross tertiary enrollment rate, and number of researchers per million
inhabitants.123
Several specific ESI indicators correspond to the theories put forth by Connolly,
Keohane, Levy, and Haas, and relate to the three hypotheses concerning the NAPAs’ lack
of capacity-building plans. The values for the Environmental Health and Basic Human
Sustenance variables could indicate a country’s level of concern, relating to Keohane’s
principal theory. If the health and food supply of a country’s population are endangered
as a result of the effects of climate change, the country will likely have a high level of
concern and be motivated to respond. The Environmental Governance indicator could
serve as a measure of a country’s political capacity, a focal point for Connolly. EcoEfficiency and Science and Technology might reveal a country’s level of technical
capacity, which is emphasized by Keohane, Levy, and Haas. Overall, based on the ESI
data sets, it appears as though all three countries should have high levels of concern and
low levels of political and technical capacity. Therefore, do the NAPAs fail to include
capacity-building in their prioritized adaptation plans because they perceive other
adaptation strategies to be more urgent? Do the LDCs lack the domestic technical and
intellectual expertise to identify their capacity needs and propose corresponding capacitybuilding strategies in the first place?
The ESI indicators that relate the most clearly to the NAPAs of Tanzania, Burkina
Faso, and Senegal are Environmental Health, Basic Human Sustenance, and Reducing
Environment-Related Natural Disaster Vulnerability, under the Reducing Human
Vulnerability Category. Under the category of Social and Institutional Capacity, the EcoEfficiency and Science and Technology indicators relate the most to the adaptation
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strategies put forth by the NAPAs. In 2005, the ESI indicator values for Tanzania,
Burkina Faso, and Senegal, respectively, were as follows: Environmental Health, -0.75,
-0.95, -0.45; Basic Human Sustenance, -1.08, -0.90, -0.52; Reducing EnvironmentRelated Natural Disaster Vulnerability, 0.49, 0.67, 0.46; Eco-Efficiency, 0.93, 0.23, 0.07; and Science and Technology, -0.63, -1.47, -0.74. The NAPAs imply that there is a
high level of concern about the negative implications climate change will have for human
health. Tanzania’s NAPA gives much attention to diseases that are exacerbated by the
various effects of climate change. All three countries prioritize adaptation plans related to
agriculture, since climate change greatly endangers the ability of their populations to
sustain themselves. Early warning systems for climate-related hazards are also high on
the countries’ lists of priorities. In terms of eco-efficiency, the NAPAs of all countries
included plans to install renewable energy sources in households.
It is noteworthy that specific strategies for how to build state capacity, including
technical/intellectual capacity and political/administrative capacity, are absent from all
three NAPAs. Another interesting absence is a mention of international aid. As the
theorists point out, capacity-building and aid from international institutions are often
interrelated. If an LDC wished to build technical capacity, for example, it would likely
require external aid in the form of funding, a technology transfer, or outside expertise.
The UNFCCC already promotes providing aid to LDCs through the Clean Development
Mechanism of the Kyoto Protocol, and climate change and adaptation funds provide
additional financial resources for NAPA adaptation activities.124 Furthermore, it is likely
that the NAPAs do not mention international aid simply because the countries wish to
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become self-sufficient in their adaptation efforts. The NAPAs are intended to yield
sustainable adaptation strategies that are able to be implemented by the countries
themselves. A reliance on outside organizations might perpetuate the vulnerability of
LDCs, causing them to depend on external aid rather than developing domestic
mechanisms to respond to in-country challenges. Given the assumption that LDCs want
to avoid dependence on outside aid, it is interesting that the NAPAs do not contain
domestic capacity-building plans. If Connolly is correct about the importance of political
capacity in terms of adapting to the effects of climate change, then the actors involved in
the NAPA development process overlooked a significant component of effective
adaptation. While all three NAPAs stressed the importance of technology (for early
warning systems, agriculture, irrigation, and renewable energy, among others), none of
the documents proposed measures to actually build technological capacity. Under the
presumption that the UNFCCC provided the correct guidelines for developing the
NAPAs, in the next chapters I test my hypotheses as to why the NAPAs do not contain
capacity-building plans. Is long-term capacity-building not as urgent as other adaptation
priorities? Do the LDCs ironically lack the capacity required in order develop adaptation
plans designed to build state capacity?
Burkina Faso, Senegal, and Tanzania have finalized their NAPAs relatively
recently. Out of the three countries, Senegal published its NAPA first, in 2006. Tanzania
finished its NAPA in January, 2007, and Burkina Faso in November, 2007. It may be too
early to study results in order to determine the effectiveness of the documents in terms of
successful adaptation to climate change. However, one can gain valuable insight from the
NAPA development process and from how well the NAPA adaptation plans correspond
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to the country’s climate-related vulnerabilities. In the context of the ESI indicators and
the scholarly theories on capacity-building, I examine the NAPA preparation process and
the role of the UNFCCC, the countries’ vulnerabilities to climate change, the priority
adaptation projects found in the NAPAs, and the domestic situations of the three
countries in terms of geography, natural resources, education, economy, government, and
historical background.
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III. Tanzania
Tanzania’s Vulnerability to Climate Change
As a result of its diverse geography, heavy dependence on natural resources, and
low level of development, Tanzania experiences a range of climate-related
vulnerabilities. The country’s National Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) is
designed to address these urgent vulnerabilities. However, an examination of Tanzania’s
NAPA content in light of scholarly theories on effective adaptation to climate change
suggests that the NAPA may be missing certain essential elements. The NAPA addresses
the physical effects of climate change, but fails to include plans for building state
capacity – an important component of long-term sustainability and successful adaptation.
Two possible hypotheses, as introduced in the previous chapter, help to explain the
disconnect between the contents of Tanzania’s NAPA and what the scholars mentioned in
the previous chapter believe is required for least developed countries to adapt to climate
change. Do Tanzanians simply view other adaptation priorities – adaptation strategies
that even the most vulnerable groups have the capacity to implement – as more urgent?
Does the country lack the domestic expertise, bureaucracy, and infrastructure – in short,
lack the state capacity – to devise an adaptation strategy with a capacity-building focus?
Tanzania is situated on the eastern coast of Africa. Kenya, Uganda, Rwanda,
Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Zambia, Malawi, and Mozambique border
Tanzania on the north, west, and south.125 The Indian Ocean lies to the east. Tanzania’s
varied geography consists of coastal areas, arid lands, semi-arid lands, plateaus,
highlands, and alluvial plains.126 Well-known geographical features include Mount
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Kilimanjaro and Lake Victoria. Land is extremely important to the livelihoods of
Tanzanians: agriculture accounts for over 40% of the GDP, comprises 85% of exports,
and provides employment to 80% of Tanzania’s workforce.127 However, as a
consequence of topography and climate, less than 5% of Tanzania’s land is arable.128 The
country’s principal exports include gold, coffee, cashew nuts, manufactures, and cotton.
Tanzania is a least-developed country (LDC), and its economic situation reflects its low
level of development: the country’s per capita income level places it in the bottom 10%
of the world’s economies.129 Over half of the population is below the national poverty
line, with the clearest divide between urban and rural communities.130
An overview of sub-Saharan Africa’s primary climate-related vulnerabilities
according to the IPCC was presented in the introductory chapter of this study. Jouni
Paavola probes deeper in his case study on Tanzania in Fairness in Adaptation to Climate
Change. There is a disconnect between the scholarly perception of Tanzania’s most
significant climate-related vulnerabilities (including human capital, access to technology,
inequality, and the quality of institutions) and the conclusions drawn by Tanzania’s
NAPA team (food, water, energy, industry, health, etc.). According to Paavola, the
groups in Tanzania most vulnerable to the impacts of climate change are women,
children, pastoralists, and the rural poor – and the NAPA should make a special effort to
address these groups. Tanzania’s NAPA does mention the needs of the rural poor, and the
NAPA team included rural farmers in the consultation process. However, the NAPA does
not seem to give particular consideration to women or children.
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Paavola believes that effective vulnerability reduction requires three distinct
components. These components are significant, because they indicate a way in which
Tanzania’s NAPA diverges from a more successful path to adaptation. The three
components are: (1) Effective governance of environmental resources, such as forests or
water, because it is important in order to ensure sustainability of livelihoods; (2)
Institutional reforms and investments in infrastructure, because they help to improve
market access and expand income generation in rural areas; (3) Public programs,
spending on health, education, and social welfare, because they contribute to the maintain
and enhancement of human capital.131 All three of these components are types of
capacity-building. The absence of adaptive capacity also factors into a scholarly
evaluation of a country’s vulnerability to the effects of climate change. In his study,
Paavola considers social aspects such as class, gender, poverty, and sources of livelihood
in addition to the physical status of the environment.132 Deficiencies in any of these
aspects will set vulnerable groups at a disadvantage. Scholarly vulnerability reduction
theories seem strongly linked to state capacity, in contrast to the adaptation measures
proposed by Tanzania’s NAPA team, which focus on the physical impacts of climate
change while ignoring societal factors.
Key sources of vulnerability pointed out by Paavola do not entirely match up with
the vulnerabilities addressed in Tanzania’s NAPA. The scholar considers a broad array of
factors, combining social science with the physical impacts of climate change. Tanzania’s
NAPA team, on the other hand, seems to concentrate heavily on the physical aspects.
This distinction could perhaps be a reflection of the limitations of Tanzania’s domestic
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capacity – as a whole, the country may lack the capacity it needs in order to determine the
kind of capacity it requires. Both physical and intangible human capital such as
longevity, health, nutritional status, literacy, education, skills, and access to information
are important in terms of adapting to climate change. Deficiencies in any of these aspects
could negatively impact income, human development, and the capacity to act (for
example, to respond to climate change). A lack of effective technology in transport,
telecommunication networks, public utilities, and agricultural inputs shrinks incomes,
hinders both specialization and diversification of livelihoods, and constrains human
development. Levels and sources of income are vulnerable to climate change, and
growing income inequality disproportionately harms vulnerable groups, reduces social
cohesion, and thus diminishes a society’s ability to cooperate. Social capital can be
another factor influencing vulnerability to climate change, since a lack of social capital
reduces the capacity and quality of the institutions responsible for devising and
implementing adaptation strategies.133
There is a distinction between impacts of climate change and vulnerabilities to
climate change. Impacts are the physical effects of climate change, whereas
vulnerabilities refer to the human implications of climate change’s impacts. NAPAs
theoretically are intended to address both aspects, with the overall goal of reducing
vulnerability, but Tanzania’s NAPA seems to concentrate heavily on the impacts rather
than the vulnerabilities. It is also important to take into consideration how both the
vulnerabilities and impacts are likely to change over time; Tanzania’s NAPA does
manage to acknowledge both present and future effects of climate change. The current
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and future situations of both climate change impacts and Tanzania’s climate-related
vulnerabilities are presented in the following tables:

Summary of Predicted Climate Change Impacts on Tanzania:134
Climate impacts
Current situation
Future situation
Food production
Climate variability has a
Staple crop yields will
significant impact on food
decrease and food production
production and security
risks increase
Land cover changes, fires
Forests and land cover
Substantial stocks of forest
and coping with droughts
resources, but land use
accelerate deforestation
changes and harvesting
levels cause deforestation
Water resources
Periodic droughts and
Periodic droughts and
flooding
flooding become more
frequent
Deforestation increases
seasonal flooding and water
scarcity
Human settlements
Low-lying settlements
Floods will cause property
affected by floods
damage more frequently
Human health
Water and insect-borne
The spread and incidence of
diseases cause significant
water and insect borne
mortality and morbidity
diseases increases
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Summary of Current and Future Vulnerabilities of Tanzania to Climate Change:135
Vulnerabilities
Current
Future
Future deterioration in health
Human capital
Health and educational
and educational outcomes is
outcomes are poor and
possible and an urban-rural
deteriorating. Rural
divide is likely to persist
outcomes are worse than
urban ones
Access to technologies
Weak communications,
Infrastructure will improve
transport and utility
and provide better access
infrastructure
especially in urban areas
Subsistence farming remains
Income levels and risks
Subsistence agriculture the
important but is increasingly
most important and
environmentally risky source complemented with market
participation and its risks
of livelihoods and income
Inequality
Urban-rural divide important Inequality is likely to
increase both in terms of
manifestation of inequality
incomes and human
both in terms of income and
development
human development
Social capital and the quality Capacity for collective action Considerable uncertainty
regarding the stability and
of institutions
present but institutions lack
strength of civil society as
quality and the state suffers
well as state capacity
from lack of capacity

Tanzania’s NAPA
In its NAPA, Tanzania lists what it perceives to be its own most pressing
vulnerabilities to the impacts of climate change. Food production and access to water are
vulnerable to drought. A severe drought could cause food shortages, food insecurity,
water scarcity, hunger, and power shortages. The economy, particularly agriculture,
energy, and forestry, is vulnerable to changes in rainfall – different from drought, since
rainfall is predicted to decrease in some parts of the country but increase in others. The
agricultural sector is extremely vulnerable, because increased temperatures, altered
rainfall, climatic variability, erosion, and environmental degradation all affect crop
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production.136 Tanzania cites its top four climate-related hazards as epidemics, drought,
plant diseases/pests/vermin, and floods.
Interestingly, Tanzania incorporates the responses of the stakeholders consulted
by the NAPA team in its vulnerability assessment. Nearly half of those surveyed
attributed the outbreak of epidemics to prolonged rainfall or drought, 30% to climatic
variability, 41% simply to human health, and 10% to poverty. An overwhelming majority
thought that drought was a problem because of prolonged periods of low rainfall, 60%
because of the effects of the variability of rainfall onset on crops, and 53% because of
increased desertification. Thirty-one percent of the stakeholders who believed pests to be
a significant problem thought that climate change was the main problem (prolonged
rainfall/dryness) and 14% blamed poverty. Eighty-three percent of stakeholders attributed
floods to prolonged rainfall, and 19% to climate change.137 Perhaps the natural science
focus of the country’s NAPA team results from the physical environment leanings of the
participating stakeholders.
NAPA Content and Adequacy
Tanzania appears to have adhered fairly well to the NAPA structure put forth by
the UNFCCC. The document begins with an introduction containing country-specific
background information, then follows by presenting an overview of the adverse impacts
of climate change both experienced in the present and predicted for the future. The
NAPA also includes links to existing national development plans, vital adaptation needs
(expressed in a section on vulnerability to climate change and sectoral analyses), criteria
for selecting adaptation priority activities, profiles of the proposed activities, and barriers
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to implementation.138 At the surface level, no NAPA component seems to be missing
from the document.
The main goals of Tanzania’s NAPA vary from immediate action to long-term,
from community-based actions to national policy, from improving natural resource use to
educating the public. The goals are listed as followed: (1) identify and develop immediate
and urgent NAPA activities in order to adapt to climate change and climate variability;
(2) protect life and livelihoods of people, infrastructure, biodiversity and environment;
(3) mainstream adaptation activities into national and sectoral development policies and
strategies, development goals, visions, and objectives; (4) increase public awareness (in
communities, civil society, and government officials) to the impacts of climate change
and adaptation strategies; (5) assist communities to improve and sustain human and
technological capacity for environmentally friendly natural resource use; (6) complement
national and community development activities hampered by adverse effects of climate
change; and (7) create long-term sustainable livelihoods and development activities at
both the community and national levels in light of changing climatic conditions.139
The NAPA is intended to address a country’s immediate adaptation needs, which
stem from the country’s primary climate-related vulnerabilities. Tanzania ranks what it
perceives to be its most vulnerable sectors in terms of the negative affects of climate
change. These sectors include agriculture and food security, water, energy, forestry,
health, wildlife, tourism, industry, coastal and marine resources, human settlements, and
wetlands.140 The NAPA then presents a ranking of project activities within each sector.
For agriculture and food security, including livestock, the project activities were as
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follows (in order of highest to lowest priority): increasing irrigation to boost maize
production; implementing alternative farming systems; making better use of climate and
weather data and other management tools; creating awareness of the negative effects of
climate change; increasing the use of manure as fertilizer; developing range management
for livestock production; changing land use patterns; implementing dip irrigation;
controlling pests, weeds, diseases; implementing biological control of the tsetse fly; and
promoting indigenous knowledge.141 For this sector, technical fixes were the most highly
prioritized adaptation activities. Less tangible measures, such as awareness and
indigenous knowledge, were ranked lower.
Project activities for the water sector were: the development of alternative water
storage programs and technology for communities; promoting water harvesting and
storage facilities; developing reservoirs; implementing community based catchments
conservation and management; employing new water serving technologies in irrigation;
installing early warning systems for droughts and floods; and developing recycle and
reuse facilities in the industrial sector.142 Again, the NAPA focuses on the “tech fixes”
and does not consider adaptation strategies that address the country’s institutional/societal
situation.
The activities listed in the energy sector and forestry sector also fail to go beyond
the technical/physical level. In the energy sector, prioritized activities included: exploring
and investing in alternative clean energy sources; the use of community based minihydropower; improving the efficiency of using biomass for energy; geo-thermal power
generation; harnessing proven coal reserves; the promotion of cogeneration in the
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industry sector; and enhancing natural gas utilization.143 Some of these proposed
solutions, such as coal and natural gas, are not environmentally sustainable. Forestry
activities consisted of afforestation programs in degraded lands using adaptive and fastgrowing trees; community forest fire prevention programs; strengthening communitybased forest management practices; the promotion of alternative sources of energy for
domestic and industrial uses; promoting efficient technologies to reduce the use of wood;
and enhancing the development of buffer zones and wildlife migratory routes.144
Priority activities for the health sector involved the establishment or strengthening
of community awareness programs on preventable major health hazards; ensuring the
availability of sufficient trained staff at health facilities; strengthening malaria control
programs; implementing early warning systems and emergency measures; establishing
health and climate collaboration; employing efficient and coordinated early warning
systems in all districts; and utilizing efficient communication equipment to assist early
diagnoses.145
Adaptation activities relating to the wildlife sector included providing assistance
to rural communities in managing wildlife resources; supporting the implementation of
community based management programs; combating illegal hunting and forest fires;
creating a wildlife information database; protecting migratory corridors and buffer zones;
developing and implementing management plans for protected/conserved areas; and
improving wildlife/ecological surveillance systems.146
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In the tourism sector, activities consisted of establishing alternative source of
income for community in tourist area; developing a community based fire protection and
control program; creating and protecting buffer zones around national parks and game
reserves; sustainable tourism activities; and the relocation of people residing in wildlife
corridors.147
For the industrial sector, Tanzania’s NAPA proposes improving energy efficiency
in industrial energy consumption; improving the efficiency of raw materials use;
developing alternative uses of raw materials; water harvesting and recycling; installing or
improving permanent drainage systems; and the implementation of renewable energy
sources.148
Adaptation activities recommended for coastal and marine resources were the
construction of artificial structures for beaches; restoring degraded habitats; the reduction
or elimination of non-climate stresses (ex. elimination of over-fishing, pollution
reduction); relocation of small island communities as a result of sea-level rise;
establishing protected areas; and desalinization of seawater.149
Priority adaptation plans for human settlements included implementing a new
land tenure system; relocating vulnerable communities; devising a database for hazardprone areas; sensitizing communities to climate change related hazards; a rural area
improvement plan; a framework for dealing with disasters; improved zoning planning;
and improved building codes.150
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Finally, adaptation activities for the wetlands sector consisted of an inventory of
wetland ecosystem types, an inventory of the spatial distribution of wetland ecosystems;
wetlands monitoring programs; establishing Ramsar sites for sustainable management;
and generating adequate capacity-building, awareness, and education on wetland
management issues related to climate change.151 The fact the only mention of capacitybuilding occurs in the last priority of the last priority sector is significant because it
indicates an awareness of the need for capacity on the part of Tanzania’s NAPA team.
Therefore, perhaps capacity-building plans are not included in the final list of prioritized
activities because Tanzania does not perceive capacity-building to be as urgent as the
other activities.
The end product of a NAPA is a prioritized list of feasible adaptation plans that
respond to the country’s most urgent climate change vulnerabilities. The NAPA team
selects priority adaptation activities according to a set of criteria. The UNFCCC lets the
LDC determine the criteria it will use for the selection and prioritization of adaptation
activities, but it does provide a number of suggestions. According to the UNFCCC,
selection criteria should include considerations of the “level or degree of adverse effects
of climate change; poverty reduction to enhance adaptive capacity; synergy with other
multilateral environmental agreements; and cost-effectiveness” and should apply to a
variety of sectors such as health, agriculture, water, infrastructure, land use management,
and coastal zones.152 Tanzania’s criteria for ranking adaptation programs adhere
faithfully to the UNFCCC’s recommendations. Additional criteria included in the NAPA,
though not specifically stated by the UNFCCC, include the improvement of the
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livelihood of rural communities; the effect of the adaptation plan on the most vulnerable
groups within communities (specifically the rural poor); “locally-driven criteria”; and the
overriding goal of responding to the immediate and urgent adaptation needs as argued by
the stakeholders.153 As well as adhering to the UNFCCC’s suggestions, Tanzania’s
criteria seem to be fair and just, with a focus on helping the most vulnerable groups.154
Tanzania’s finalized, prioritized list of adaptation strategies is as follows: “(1)
Water efficiency in irrigation for crop production (to boost yield and to conserve water);
(2) Development of alternative farming systems and water harvesting; (3) Development
of alternative water storage programs and technology for communities; (4) Community
based catchments conservation and management programs; (5) Exploration and
investment in alternative clean energy sources (wind, solar, bio-diesel, etc.) to
compensate for lost hydropower potential; (6) Promotion of cogeneration in industry
sector to compensate for lost hydropower potential; (7) Afforestation programs in
degraded lands, using more adaptive and fast growing tree species; (8) Development of
community-based forest fire prevention programs; (9) Establishment and strengthening of
community awareness programs on preventable major health hazards; (10)
Implementation of sustainable tourism activities in coastal areas, and relocation of
vulnerable communities from low-lying areas; (11) Enhancement of wildlife protection
services and assistance to rural communities in managing wildlife resources; (12) Water
harvesting and recycling; (13) Construction of artificial structures (ex. sea walls, putting
sand on beaches, coastal drain beach management systems); and finally (14)
Establishment of a land tenure system, and the promotion of sustainable human
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settlements.”155 Overall, Tanzania’s adaptation priorities consist of tangible solutions
with a focus on the physical environment, and do not include measures for increasing the
state capacity that scholars such as Connolly, Keohane, Levy, and Haas believe to be
important for effective adaptation. A number of Tanzania’s adaptation strategies require a
certain amount of existing capacity for implementation, but none are designed to increase
state capacity.
NAPA Development Process
Like the prioritization criteria, the process of developing the NAPA seems to be
consistent with the UNFCCC’s recommendations. The country’s Vice President’s Office
– Division of Environment created a National Climate Change Focal Point body, which
was responsible for the formation of a NAPA team. The NAPA team consisted of 20
experts from various sectors, including energy and industry, livestock, agriculture, forest,
land use, wildlife and wetland, marine and freshwater resources, tourism, and health. The
NAPA team was then divided into four groups. The groups consulted a range of
stakeholders in different parts of the country, then compiled their findings and analyzed
the impacts of climate change throughout the whole of Tanzania.
Overall, the NAPA team conducted consultations in 13 districts and 52 villages,
and developed a synthesis report “based on past and present studies, on climate change
and coping strategies.”156 A public consultation, involving interviews and questionnaires
administered to various stakeholders (government officials, private sectors, industries,
communities) followed the synthesis report. According to the explanatory section in the
NAPA document, Tanzania’s NAPA team had employed sound scientific research in its
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assessment of climate vulnerability. The Minister of State, Vice President’s Office –
Environment endorsed the final draft of the NAPA. Tanzania appears to have closely
followed the NAPA development procedure proposed by the UNFCCC.
The UNFCCC’s least-developed country expert group (LEG) played a significant
role in shaping the NAPA development.157 The following principles were determined by
the LEG: (1) The development of the NAPA should be a participatory process, including
a sectoral participatory approach; a multi-disciplinary, multi-sectoral NAPA team should
be established; consultations should involve the participation of stakeholders from public
sector and private sector organizations, including government ministries and departments,
academic/research institutions, NGOs, the media; (2) The NAPA should follow a
multidisciplinary approach, meaning that the NAPA team should include experts from
both government institutions, such as ministries, universities, agencies, and private
institutions/NGOs; (3) The NAPA should take on a complementary approach, in order to
be compatible with existing national environment and development programs, such as
poverty reduction, agricultural sector development, rural development, and the National
Action Plan to Combat Desertification; (4) The NAPA should promote sustainable
development; (5) NAPA development should be a country-driven process; (6) The NAPA
should strive for cost-effectiveness; (7) The NAPA should aim for simplicity, so that the
document can be easily understood by communities; and (8) The NAPA should be
flexible, so that a range of actors (private sector, NGOs, individuals, and government
institutions) will be able to implement NAPA activities.158
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As mentioned previously, the NAPA was drafted after conducting a number of
sectoral consultations. Farmers proved influential actors in the community sector, as they
were able to share with the NAPA team their firsthand experience regarding the effects of
climate change and their coping strategies. The farmers have been dealing with climate
change by using both indigenous knowledge and modern science and technology.159 The
NAPA team hoped that the participatory approach would ensure transparency and would
increase the likelihood that “proposed activities are implemented and adopted by target
vulnerable communities.”160
Hypotheses and Analyses
While the UNFCCC provides specific guidelines for the development and
structure of the NAPA, individual LDCs are responsible for coming up with the content
of their NAPAs. This country-driven approach is designed to ensure that the resulting
adaptation plans address each LDC’s own climate vulnerabilities.161 One of the main
ways in which the UNFCCC influences an LDC is by suggesting which types of
adaptation priorities would be most appropriate. Therefore, while the content of
Tanzania’s NAPA is country-specific, the type of content has been pre-determined by a
large international body.
Tanzania states that its NAPA was influenced by the objectives of the country’s
“National Development Vision 2025 for high and shared growth, quality livelihood,
peace, stability and unity, good governance, high quality education and international
competitiveness.”162 This declaration abides by the UNFCCC’s recommendation that the
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NAPA relate to existing national development plans. Consistent with the goals of the
National Development Vision, Tanzania’s NAPA also sets forth its own overall vision:
“to identify immediate and urgent Climate Change Adaptation Actions that are robust
enough to lead to long-term sustainable development in a changing climate,” and to
“identify climate change adaptation activities that most effectively reduce the risks that a
changing climate poses to sustainable development.”163 In order to realize this vision, the
NAPA is designed to address the climate-related vulnerabilities of principal economic
sectors and is intended to be “action oriented towards priority on the ground activities.”164
At first glance, the contents of Tanzania’s NAPA seem perfectly matched to the
UNFCCC’s recommendations and therefore sufficient for achieving the overall goal of
reducing climate-related vulnerabilities and adaptating to climate change. However, a
closer examination suggests that what Tanzania has come up with might not be enough in
order to effectively adapt to the adverse effects of climate change. Do action-oriented,
on-the-ground activities really lead to long-term sustainable development? What about
increasing state capacity – a more passive means of adaptation, but viewed as essential by
many scholars?
I had initially hypothesized that the UNFCCC-designed process for creating
NAPAs was too action-oriented to include relatively passive adaptation strategies such as
capacity-building. This hypothesis seemed plausible given the content of Tanzania’s
NAPA, but as it turns out, the UNFCCC does include the enhancement of capacity in its
recommendations.165 The UNFCCC certainly encourages an action-oriented focus for the
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NAPA, but it is not the fault of the UNFCCC that Tanzania’s NAPA does not include
capacity-building plans. This initial hypothesis was not explored in the second two case
studies.
The next hypothesis suggests that African LDCs might be more concerned about
responding to the immediate impacts of climate change, via adaptation strategies that
vulnerable groups are able to implement, than about longer-term capacity-building
strategies. Tanzania’s priority adaptation activities do address the vulnerabilities
mentioned in the country’s NAPA; however, Tanzania’s NAPA does not incorporate all
of the vulnerabilities presented by Paavola. While Paavola considers the big picture,
including both social factors and the physical impacts of climate change, Tanzania’s
NAPA team approaches the issue of climate vulnerability with a narrower focus. Given
the country’s extensive consultative and participatory NAPA development process, it
seems that the majority of Tanzanians believe that physical adaptation plans are higher
priority than capacity-building. It is apparent that the NAPA team was aware of the need
for capacity; capacity-building plans may have been out-ranked by the 14 adaptation
plans that made it onto the NAPA’s final priority list. The hypothesis that the NAPA does
not contain capacity-building as a result of the Tanzanians’ prioritization of urgent
adaptation needs appears to be valid.
Is it plausible that Tanzania does not include capacity-building plans in its NAPA
because LDCs lack the capacity to design and implement such plans? The UNFCCC’s
and the GEF’s country-driven approach, described in the introductory chapter of this
study, suggests that the content of a NAPA should be left to the country itself. The
reasoning is that a country’s NAPA will better reflect the needs of the LDC and will have
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a higher chance of implementation if domestic stakeholders have an influential role in the
development process. Tanzania acknowledges the fact that its under-developed condition
might hinder the implementation of its adaptation strategies, but what about hindrances to
the ability to even come up with certain types of adaptation plans? The Tanzanian NAPA
team was aware of the challenges faced by the country in terms of carrying out the
priority activities, and included a “barriers to implementation” section in the NAPA
document. These barriers include limited internal capacity to fund adaptation activities;
extreme poverty of most vulnerable groups; poor infrastructure, especially rural roads
with limited access; limited credit opportunities for rural communities; the impact of
HIV/AIDS; poor health conditions and resource-poor rural communities; and,
significantly, the “limited analytical capability of local personnel to effectively analyze
the threats and potential impacts of climate change, so as to develop viable adaptation
solutions.”166
Tanzania’s difficult past, similar to that of many other African LDCs, helps
explain the country’s barriers to implementing its NAPA. Numerous African countries
have weak political systems and public administrations. Sometimes a weak state is the
main explanation for a country’s underdevelopment.167 Tanzania has experienced periods
of turmoil as pre-colonial, colonial, and post-independence regimes demolished
“traditional authority structures.”168 Tanzania gained independence from the United
Kingdom in 1964. The country inherited a certain degree of central public administration
from the colonial period; in 1962, for example, local governments were formed under
British guidance. However, these local authorities disrupted existing hierarchical
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structures. In the late1960s and early 1970s, the young Tanzanian government created
organized villages in order to facilitate the provision of water, transport, healthcare, and
education. These new villages destroyed traditional ways of life. Chama Cha Mapinduzi
(CCM), the ruling political party, exerted its influence by further dismantling the
Tanzanians’ established authority structures. Authority conflicts occurred between the
public administration and the party organization.169 Government corruption also occurred
during the first several years of Tanzania’s independence, when heightened state control
over the economy inadvertently gave public sector employees a dangerous amount of
economic influence, until the 1967 Arusha Declaration prevented party involvement in
economic activities.170
In its early days of independence, participation in politics was only possible
through involvement with the CCM party. In 1992, the country transitioned to a
multiparty political system. Nevertheless, Tanzania still faces numerous state-related
problems. The country is considered only “partially free” in terms of rights and civil
liberties scores.171 The opposition party, the Civic United Front, has experienced
violence, and the Islamic Awareness Society has been responsible for small scale
terrorism.172 In 2002, Tanzania achieved a score of 2.7 in Transparency International’s
Perceived Corruption Index. A score of 0 means extremely high corruption, whereas 10
signifies no corruption, so Tanzania’s score indicates that the country’s level of
corruption is quite high. One possible explanation for the corruption occurring in
Tanzania is that real earnings are decreasing, thus providing incentives for side income
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and dishonesty.173 There have also been suspicious linkages between party organization
and public administration, and incidents in which government members have misused
their political power.174
However, corruption is not the biggest obstacle faced by Tanzanians. According
to a survey conducted by the World Bank, inadequate infrastructure, the level and
complexity of taxes, and export and import regulations constitute greater barriers to
business than corruption.175 Barriers to business are significant, because Tanzania might
not be able to achieve its development and adaptation goals without reaching some level
of economic success. The Tanzanian state often has difficulty carrying out its tasks.
Public administration frequently lacks the capacity to perform various duties, such as
collecting local poll taxes.176 Problems with the public administration system are being
addressed by a number of ongoing reforms, but the success of these programs has been
doubtful. For example, public sector pay reforms led to increased salaries, yet the new
salaries remain inadequate for subsistence.177
While the national government struggles, lower-level governments face
challenges as well. Rural governments have the least capacity, since they lack many of
the resources common to urban governments.178 Likewise, rural populations have the
toughest time coping on a daily basis and also have a hard time making their voices
heard. Vulnerable groups face obstacles to participation in consultations and to access to
markets and public services, and often lack resources for articulating their concerns.179 As
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mentioned earlier, women and children constitute particularly vulnerable rural groups.
When compared to men’s daily activities, women’s tasks typically have much more to do
with the land. Therefore, women are more affected by climate change, and have less time
for non-climate-dependent activities that generate income. Children frequently drop out
of school in order to take part in household chores or economic activities. Sometimes a
child will go to work in a city and send money back home.180 This type of life could
mean that a number of Tanzanians simply do not have the education necessary to develop
the most appropriate strategies for adapting to the negative effects of climate change.
In terms of education, social and institutional capacity, and science and
technology, Tanzania fares better than Burkina Faso and Senegal, the other case studies
in this report. According to the Human Development Index, Tanzania’s adult literacy rate
is 69.4% – much higher than that of Burkina Faso or Senegal, but the fact remains that
roughly 30% of Tanzanian adults cannot read.181 The Environmental Sustainability Index
indicators show that Tanzania has relatively high female primary education completion
rate when compared with other African LDCs. Tanzania also has a greater level social
and institutional capacity than Burkina Faso or Senegal, a higher score for science and
technology, and a higher level of eco-efficiency (especially hydropower and renewable
energy production as percentage of total energy consumption).182 Regardless, it appears
as though Tanzania may lack the government capacity and domestic expertise required to
develop the most appropriate NAPA, including capacity-building adaptation activities.
Tanzania’s poorly-functioning government is significant; the hypothesis that a country’s
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NAPA lacks capacity-building plans as a result of the country’s weak domestic capacity
is compelling.
Conclusion
A close examination of Tanzania’s NAPA, including both the development
process and the document’s content, a study of the country’s perceived vulnerabilities to
climate change, and an investigation of Tanzania’s historical and governmental context
leads to the conclusion that the country’s weak state capacity is the principal explanation
for the NAPA’s lack of capacity-building plans. Vulnerable groups, particularly the rural
poor, are particularly lacking in capacity; state capacity tends to be lower for local, smallscale governments. Tanzania’s poorly-functioning government can be attributed in part to
the legacy of colonization. My initial hypothesis, that the UNFCCC played a role in the
omission of capacity-building in the NAPAs, did not turn out to be useful, because it does
not appear that the UNFCCC’s guidance deters capacity-building.
My second hypothesis, regarding the LDC’s own perceptions of vulnerability,
does relate to the lack of capacity-building in Tanzania. The NAPA might not include
capacity-building plans partially because Tanzanians do not consider capacity to be an
urgent adaptation need, since the groups the most vulnerable to climate change are
unlikely to be able to implement capacity-building plans. However, the third hypothesis
holds the most weight. The colonial legacy has left Tanzania in a condition of disarray.
The country lacks the capability to maintain a functioning economy and to reform public
policy, thus impeding the ability to develop – never mind implement – comprehensive
capacity-building plans. The state is unable to successfully reform its administration; it is
no surprise that capacity-building has been overlooked or excluded.
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IV. Burkina Faso
Vulnerabilities to Climate Change in Burkina Faso
Burkina Faso is a landlocked country in the center of sub-Saharan West Africa.
Mali lies to the northwest of Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire to the southwest, Ghana and
Togo directly to the south, Benin to the southeast, and Niger to the east.183 Burkina
Faso’s geographic location renders the country especially vulnerable to the negative
impacts of climate change and climatic variability.184 Currently, Burkina Faso has a
population of 11,849,520. The majority of the population is young, and 51.1% of
Burkinabés are female. Nearly 90% of the population is rural, and the country has a low
population density with 43.2 inhabitants per square kilometer. Life expectancy is roughly
53 years,185 and only 23.5% of Burkinabé adults are literate.186 The country’s low level of
development intensifies its vulnerabilities to climate change. In this chapter, I investigate
Burkina Faso’s perceptions of vulnerability and the country’s developmental situation,
including colonial legacy, education, and economy, as explanations for why its NAPA
does not include plans to build state capacity.
Burkina Faso’s climate is tropical with sub-Saharan dominance, meaning that arid
conditions prevail throughout most of the territory.187 The rainy season is short and the
dry season long. There is some amount of climatic differentiation across the country: the
Saharan zone in the north receives the least amount of precipitation, the northern subSaharan zone in the center of the country receives slightly more rainfall, while the sub-
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Saharan zone in the south experiences a rainy season that lasts nearly half the year.188 The
principal effects of climate change on Burkina Faso include drought, flooding, heat
waves, dust storms, and an increase in the frequency and severity of extreme weather
events.189 The most vulnerable sectors and societal groups in Burkina Faso, according to
the country’s NAPA, are strongly dependent on the state of the environment. Climaterelated disruptions in the water sector, agricultural sector, and forestry sector strongly
affect rural populations, particularly small-scale growers, women, and children.190
Like most other countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Burkina Faso views a net
reduction of water availability and a drastic drop in agricultural productivity as
significant consequences of climate change. Water resources in Burkina Faso almost
exclusively consist of tributaries and underground reservoirs fed by rainfall.191 Scientists
state that it is the the variability of rainfall – not simply a decrease in net rainfall average
– that causes most water-related challenges associated with climate change in West
Africa. Rainfall unreliability and seasonality affects agriculture, economy, and
livelihoods.192 Dry years and droughts are typically caused by the inter-annual variability
of rainfall, rather than a low average level of rainfall. The distinction between drought
and an arid climate is important. Aridity, the result of a low average rainfall, is an
enduring feature of a region’s climate. Drought, “the temporary deficiency in rainfall
significantly below the normal or expected amount in a year, season, or month,” is
affected by rainfall variability.193
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Rainfall variability occurs in different forms. Spatial variability is the difference
in rainfall received between places, either structurally or proximately, within a given
year. On the one hand, this type of variability can render mechanisms such as early
warning systems less effective, since spatial variability is localized, and thus increases
vulnerability to drought. On the other had, spatial rainfall variability does not necessarily
compromise an entire region’s food supply, since there is a good chance that a
neighboring village has escaped the drought.194 Inter-annual variability explains the
difference in rainfall between years, the annual deviation from a longer-term average.
This type of variability is not particularly noteworthy, unless the distribution of monthly
rainfall is also taken into account (since changes in monthly distribution can greatly
impact agriculture). Intra-annual variability has to do with the seasonal concentration of
rainfall, the distribution of rainfall within a year. Intra-annual variability has especially
significant implications for sub-Saharan West Africa, since yearly rainfall in this region
is typically concentrated in one wet season (a “uni-modal” rainfall pattern). The duration
of the rainy season increases as one moves from north to south in sub-Saharan West
Africa.195 Farming activities take place predominantly in the wet season. Food often
becomes scarce in the months leading up to the start of this season. Seasonality in the
agricultural cycle, influenced by rainfall, affects nearly all aspects of life in countries
such as Burkina Faso: food availability, food prices, prices of consumer goods and labor,
labor demands, migration patterns, health, births, and deaths are all linked to seasons and
rainfall patterns.196 Although intra-annual rainfall variability can lead to uncertainty and
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agricultural problems, the seasonal concentration of rainfall is essential for crop
production in many areas, since “an even distribution would mean that the monthly
rainfall throughout the year would not be sufficient to sustain plant growth in any
period.”197
Ecologically, Burkina Faso’s territory is divided in two: the Sahelian region in the
north, and the soudanien region in the south. Drylands comprise most of the northern
region, while the larger southern region is marked by savannas and agro-forestry parks.198
According to Burkina Faso’s NAPA, the over-exploitation of vegetal resources, a
consequence of livestock and agriculture, is a human contribution to environmental
degradation that should be addressed, because this type of degradation is augmented by
the impacts of climate change.199 The country’s predominant crops include sorghum,
corn, rice, and cotton. Ruminants and poultry are Burkina Faso’s most common fauna.
Burinkabé soils are of poor quality,200 which makes agriculture particularly challenging.
The Kaya Region
A study on the Kaya Region illustrates the difficult conditions in Burkina Faso’s
drylands. The Kaya Region is semi-arid, mostly rural, and has a relatively high
population density.201 The city of Kaya is the only urban area in the region. The
vegetation resembles a savannah, with thorn bushes in the north and dispersed trees in the
south. Soils are sandy, have a low organic matter content, a low water retention capacity,
and often undergo considerable amounts of degradation – in short, the soils are not
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conducive to cultivation.202 For approximately 90% of households in the region, the main
activities are crop cultivation and animal husbandry. Millet and sorghum are the primary
crops, and cattle are the most common livestock. Trade and off-farm activities are not a
significant contribution to income, but many households engage artisan activities such as
weaving, cloth-dying, and pottery. Many of the region’s inhabitants are also bicycle
repairmen, butchers, tanners, teachers. The region has practically no industry, and
seasonal labor migration to the Côte d’Ivoire has become an important part of Kaya
inhabitants’ livelihood.203
The climate in northern Burkina Faso is hostile, even without the predicted
negative effects of climate change. The dry season in the Kaya Region lasts roughly 8
months. The 4-month rainy season starts in June. July and August are the most humid
months in the Kaya, and the only months during which rainfall exceeds evapotranspiration.204 Total rainfall fluctuates considerably from one year to the next, and
rainfall distribution varies throughout each season. 80% of rain “falls in high intensity
showers,” meaning that the amount of water falling from the sky often exceeds the soil’s
infiltration capacity. Runoff and erosion are common problems. Rain showers in the
Kaya Region are localized; one village may receive a torrential downpour while a
neighboring village experiences a prolonged dry spell.205
A severe drought in the early 1970s prompted Burkinabés to wonder if a change
of climate was occurring. A brutal drying trend spread through the entire Sahelian region
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of Africa, and led to 100,000 deaths.206 Scientists across the world have since come to the
consensus that anthropogenic climate change is, in fact, an ongoing situation that must be
addressed. However, drought and environmental degradation in the Kaya Region cannot
be solely attributed to a changing climate. The complex relationship between drought,
climatic variability, and environmental degradation is affected by factors such as
population growth, land use, and urbanization.207 Livestock grazing and cultivation of
woodlands often leads to the degradation of vegetation, which in turn intensifies erosion
and runoff. It is estimated that, under favorable conditions, 30 years is the minimum
amount of time required for soils to recover their fertility;208 however, it would be
impossible for inhabitants to stop using the land in the meantime, since agriculture and
livestock are the basis for Burkinabé livelihood.
Food production has been a constant challenge in the Kaya region. Food shortages
and famine have been recurring problems since pre-colonial times. For example, the
Zogoré hunger of the 1830s killed tens of thousands of people over the course of its 6year duration.209 In the 1970s drought, Burkinabés depended heavily on exterior food aid.
During the 1970s and 1980s, rainfall strongly affected food production. Food security, on
the other hand, was influenced by a variety of factors, including yield, food reserves from
previous years, possibilities of food imports and aid, prices and availability of food in
markets, and the population’s purchasing power.210
The food production system in Burkina Faso has evolved over the decades.
Agriculture used to be an activity for large social groups. The kin group (yiiri) grew crops
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on a collective field (puugasenga). The monetization of local economies during the
colonial regime eventually led to the “individualization” of agriculture, and food
production became less of a community effort.211 The quality of agricultural techniques
diminished, as did crop diversity, though cultivated areas extended into previously
unexploited land.212 Furthermore, for reasons outside of human control, the agricultural
season started later and became shorter,213 thus contributing to the worsening of the Kaya
region’s food situation. Farmers attempted to rectify the state of affairs by using
mechanized plows, cultivating vegetables, and growing rice in the lowlands, but these
small-scale efforts had little effect.214
Animal husbandry in the Kaya region has been considered the specialization of
the FulBe ethnic group. The FulBe are particularly known for raising cattle. However, a
different ethnic group, the Moose, hold political control over most of the territories, water
resources, and soils. The Moose prefer cultivation to animal husbandry, and practice a
different style of livestock rearing than the FulBe. The Moose’s strict control of the land
limits the mobility of FulBe herdsmen, impoverishing the ethnic minority. The “extensive
use of pastures [for livestock grazing] is considered impossible to reconcile with the
extension of cultivated areas.”215 Tensions between farmers and herders are common in
other African LDCs as well.
Seno, Soum, Oudalan Provinces
Historically, the provinces of Seno, Soum, and Oudalan in northeastern Burkina
Faso have been known for their livestock production. This region of Burkina Faso differs
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from the Kaya in that it is less arid, has fairly low levels of land degradation, and a low
population density. Seno, Soum, and Oudalan have longtime been home to transhumant
livestock producers, mostly the FulBe ethnic group. However, in the drought of the 1970s
and 1980s, a number of FulBe, Tamachek, and Mossi immigrated to this more arable
region;216 the diversity of ethnicities and languages is still evident. The new populations
grew millet instead of raising cattle. Although livestock is still important in this region, it
is no longer the principal occupation for most households. Interestingly, households shift
their livelihood strategy depending on precipitation. Though cultivation is the dominant
occupation, livestock becomes a more important source of income and sustenance during
periods of low precipitation.217 Too much rather than too little water has been the
predominant problem in this northern region as of late; in wet years, the area has seen
increasing damage caused by flooding.218
Over the past several decades, the Seno/Soum/Oudalan region has experienced
urbanization and a growing market economy. The extraction of mineral resources, such
as manganese, iron, calcite, and gold, has led to the development of infrastructure. A
network of roads connects the region to bigger markets; the markets in turn lead to new
technology that increases extraction efficiency.219 However, the quality and reach of
infrastructure remains limited. Better infrastructure would facilitate economic
development, which would in turn provide more resources for climate change adaptation.
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NAPA Content
The content of Burkina Faso’s NAPA reflects the recommendations of the
UNFCCC. The report is straightforward and begins with a table of contents, followed by
a summary and then an introduction. The introduction includes a definition of
vulnerability: the susceptibility of a natural or human system to be affected by the
negative effects of climate change, climatic variability, and climatic extremes.220 Burkina
Faso’s NAPA team also defines adaptation: all adjustment in natural systems or human
activities in response to current or predicted impacts of climate change, including
anticipative and reactionary adjustments.221 After declaring that the NAPA was
developed according to a participative process that implicated various actors (decisionmakers, experts, technicians, agricultural producers, communities, etc.), the NAPA
document states its objective: to identify priority actions based on the urgent and
immediate adaptation needs of vulnerable populations.222
The NAPA then provides an overview of Burkina Faso’s environmental
resources, economic context, NAPA methodology, and current climate situation.
Consistent with the UNFCCC’s proposed structure, Burkina Faso links its NAPA to its
existing national development strategies. Overlapping goals include research on selfsufficiency and food security; protection of the environment in terms of natural resource
sustainability; increased revenues for the population; and improved management of water
resources.223 Burkina Faso explains how its approach to NAPA formulation is
multidisciplinary (the expert group was comprised of people with various specialties,
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which ensures the representation of diverse sectors and activities), participative (regional
studies played a role in the NAPA preparation process), complementary (the NAPA
reflects existing policies, plans, and programs), profitable (aware of the costs of
implementation and the expected impacts on vulnerable sectors and groups), and
straightforward (effective and comprehensible for a variety of actors).224 Furthermore, the
NAPA strives to take into account the needs of different societal groups, including men,
women, children, the elderly, and farmers.
What Burkina Faso perceives as its potential barriers to NAPA implementation
are particularly interesting, because they differ from the other two case study countries.
Burkina Faso cites its obstacles as a low degree of effective participation, the slowness of
administrative procedures, insufficient financing, and social instability.225 Another aspect
that makes Burkina Faso’s NAPA unique is the inclusion of a section acknowledging
both traditional coping strategies and current adaptation practices. These practices deal
with the water sector (the obtainment of potable water, pastoral and agricultural
hydrology, and general flora and fauna needs), the agricultural sector (growing
techniques, crop diversification, and the harvesting system), and the forestry and
biodiversity sector (addressing forestry, fauna, fishing, and energy, since, like other
African countries, Burkina Faso obtains a great deal of its energy from biomass).226 One
example of the difference between traditional versus current adaptation strategies
involves the forestry sector: an indigenous coping strategy is practicing selective cutting
of woods, while a current adaptation practice is reforestation using local plant species.227
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An important section in the NAPA is the explanation of the selection of priority
activities. Burkina Faso’s NAPA team states that the most negative effects of climate
change are rainfall variability, temperature rise, violent winds, and air pollution. The
most vulnerable activity sectors are water resources, agriculture, and forestry and
biodiversity, because they all depend directly on rainfall and temperature.228 Poor rural
populations are the most vulnerable groups. Pre-selection and selection criteria were
developed in light these climate change impacts and vulnerabilities. The pre-selection
criteria for priority activities include the degree of vulnerability of involved sectors and
social groups; the link between climate variability and climate change; and local
capacities for implementing adaptation activities. This last criterion is significant, as it
may suggest that possible adaptation activities were cut from the final list because of the
low level of local capacity. The criteria used for evaluating adaptation activities that
passed the pre-selection round include the reduction of the gravity of the negative effects
of climate change/reduction of the risk of vulnerability; poverty reduction; synergy with
other multilateral environmental agreements; and a cost/benefit analysis.229 For each
proposed adaptation activity, each expert on the NAPA team assigned a mark from 0-3
regarding each criterion. 0 corresponds with no impact, 1 implies weak impact, 2
signifies average impact, and 3 stands for strong impact. The urgent priority actions
determined by Burkina Faso’s NAPA team are as follows, in order of highest to lowest
priority: famine early warning system; promotion of complementary irrigation; water
management; feed production; natural resource conservation; fight against desertification;
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optimization of irrigation; securitization of pastoral zones; promotion of CES/DRS; fauna
habitat management; and promotion of renewable energy, particularly in households.230
The NAPA team then elaborates on the urgent priority actions, and lays out a list
of corresponding priority projects accompanied by the estimated cost for each project in
US dollars. The first project on the list is the reducing climate change vulnerability by
improving food crisis prevention, followed by the promotion of complementary irrigation
in order to secure grain production; management of the mare d’Oursi (a large body of
water); feed production and reserve feed stocks for cattle in the Burkinabé Sahel; the
management of natural resources and certification of non-woody forest products in the
eastern region of Burkina Faso; fight against desertification in certain areas; the
development of irrigated corps in certain provinces; the securitization of pastoral zones in
the Sahel and eastern regions; securing agricultural production by the implementation of
various technologies; the promotion of fauna and habitat management; the
implementation of protection perimeters and the fight against the pollution of surface
water and groundwater; and the promotion of energy efficient equipment and renewable
energy technology (cookers, water heaters, solar dryers, etc.). This last adaptation activity
relates to the ESI “social and institutional capacity” indicator, 231 and happens to be the
lowest ranking priority activity as well as the most expensive project on list.
Annexes at the end of the NAPA document explain the priority projects in greater
detail. Each project includes a title, justification, description (specific objectives,
activities), means of implementation, short term results, potential long term effects, and
implementation logistics (institutional arrangements, risks and obstacles, monitoring and
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evaluation, and financial resources).232 Project 12 provides a clear example: The title is
Promotion des équipements à économie d’énergie (foyers améliorés) et des technologies
à énergies renouvelables (auto-cuiseur, chaffe-eau et séchoirs solaires, etc.), the
promotion of energy efficient equipment (improved households) and renewable energy
technology (auto-cooker, water heater and solar dryers, etc.). The project’s justification is
the need to address Burkina Faso’s current dependence on biomass for energy; over 90%
of the country’s energy needs are covered by traditional combustibles, mostly charcoal.233
This is a problem in part because of the rapid rate of urbanization; city-dwellers have
restricted access to biomass.
The project description is divided into objectives and activities, and contributions.
The objective is energy efficiency and renewable energy technology. Activities include
supporting research on renewable energies; teaching women techniques for using energy
efficient equipment; sensitizing and teaching artisans techniques for energy efficiency;
facilitating the installation of energy efficient equipment in households; and subsidizing
technology and equipment for efficient/renewable energy such as water heaters and
cookers. Short term contributions of this project are lower utility expenses, reduced
carbon dioxide emissions, and reduced time and effort for collecting biomass.
Contributions over the longer term are preserved vegetal cover, and improvement and
growth of biodiversity. In terms of implementation, the Ministère de l’Environnement et
du Cadre de Vie was named as the head of the project. Regional directives, women’s
associations, development project committees and NGOs are also expected to participate
in the implementation of the project. Arrangements for evaluation and monitoring
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conform to the regulations for the management of similar projects. Finally, the estimated
total cost of the project was 1,230,000 US dollars. An accompanying chart illustrates the
expected yearly cost of each of the project’s four main activities.234
NAPA Development Process
The methodology employed for the NAPA development started with the selection
of sites for the vulnerability and adaptation study. Ten locations were initially selected, as
representatives of vulnerability to climate change in each of the country’s three agroclimatic zones. Socio-economic criteria were used as an indication of poverty in each of
the representative zones, presumably with the idea that there is a correlation between
poverty and vulnerability. Finally, a report was produced, and the evaluation of Burkina
Faso’s vulnerabilities and capacities to adapt became the foundation for the NAPA
document. The report was validated at the regional and governmental levels.235
Burkina Faso’s NAPA team refers to the country’s NAPA development process
as participative and iterative. A wide range of actors were implicated, from state
authorities to local communities. At the governmental level, an inter-ministerial
committee was formed in order to implement the UNFCCC, which Burkina Faso ratified
in September of 2003.236 Before the start of the NAPA process, the Conseil National pour
l’Environnement et le Développement Durable (CONEDD) was established by the
Burkinabé government in order to ensure that the country’s development actions would
preserve the environment and incorporate a vision of sustainability. The Conseil National
de Secours d’Urgence et de Réhabilitation (CONASUR) had already been set in place in
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order to deal with calamities such as floods and famines, and to provide affected
populations with immediate aid.
The Secrétariat Permanent of the CONEDD was charged with the responsibility
of supervising the entire NAPA development process.237 The preparation of the NAPA
document was coordinated by the Ministère de l’Environnement et du Cadre de Vie, a
branch of the CONEDD.238 The actors responsible for the development of the NAPA kept
in mind existing international environmental agreements such as the Millennium
Development Goals and the Kyoto Protocol, ratified by Burkina Faso in March of
2005.239 A pilot committee for the development of the NAPA consisted of representatives
of technical services, international and inter-African organizations such as the United
Nations Development Program and Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la
Secheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS), various socio-professional organizations, and civil
society (including NGOs and other associations). The pilot committee decided on the
methodology for the NAPA. The NAPA team, in charge of putting the NAPA together,
also had a multi-disciplinary quality and consisted of experts from a range of fields.
Workshops were organized in order to conduct the selection of experts for the NAPA
team and then to facilitate the selection of study sites.
Participation at the regional and local levels was ensured through several different
organizational strategies. The NAPA team conducted studies in five representative zones
across the country. Each zone provided a sample of different types of administrative
authorities, personnel responsible for decentralized technical services, NGOs and other
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associations, and communities.240 Five regional workshops were organized for the
identification of the sectors and groups that are particularly vulnerable to climate change.
Furthermore, exchanges were organized between villages, to provide a range of
communities with opportunities to recount their own perceptions of the impacts of
climate change as well as the adaptation options that they identify as highest priority.
Different societal groups were represented in the intra-village gatherings, including
women, youth, the elderly, and farmers.241 After the conclusion of the regional studies,
the pilot committee reviewed the NAPA team’s work and then passed the document
along to the government.242 Burkina Faso officially adopted its climate change strategy in
2006 during a counsel with government ministers. According to the NAPA document
itself, transparency was maintained throughout all phases of the development process.243
Colonial Legacy
Like Tanzania, Burkina Faso’s history includes a period of coercive colonial rule.
The French colonial administration held control in Burkina Faso from 1897 to 1946. The
French limited options for Burkinabés, often imposed military participation and labor,
and demanded the production of cotton – a crop that would be useful for France, but that
did little in terms of providing sustenance for the Africans. Agricultural policy under the
colonial regime encouraged the expansion of commercial crops, sped up the clearing of
new areas, contributed to land scarcity, and also uprooted individuals and broke up
villages and compounds.244 Conflicts broke out during a dry decade, as people rushed for
the lowlands. Eventually, peace and security improved in the regulated areas, but pockets
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of no-man’s land had escaped the notice of the French. Many inhabitants hid in these
unsupervised areas in order to escape the colonial rule.245
Post-World War II, Burkina Faso enjoyed both a freedom from the colonial
administration and a period of relatively abundant rainfall. Young men began to migrate
to the Côte d’Ivoire and Ghana, in order to work in the cocoa industry and make money
to bring home.246 Unfortunately, the decade of sufficient rainfall was succeeded by
twenty years of recurring droughts. Again, inhabitants rushed to the more-arable
lowlands, and violent conflicts broke out. Land-related tensions were intensified after the
Revolution of 1983 and the land reform of 1984 turned all land in Burkina Faso into state
property.247 The government regime of Thomas Sankara “condemned ‘traditional’
systems of land management as feudal and created a network of revolutionary defense
committees (CDRs) in villages… which undermined the [local] authority regarding land
issues.”248
A period of stabilization followed the twenty years of droughts. It became more
common for women to accompany their husbands in their seasonal migrations to the Côte
d’Ivoire. Cooperation between the Moose and the FulBe increased, and was manifested
through cattle entrustments, gifts of milk and cereals, lending of money, and similar signs
of trust. However, ethnic tensions began to resurface after 1997, between the Moose and
the FulBe and also between the Moose that migrated and the populations in their
destination areas. These renewed tensions can be attributed to pressure on natural
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resources in addition to the confusion caused by democratization, decentralization, and
privatization.249
The economic situation in Burkina Faso exacerbates the country’s vulnerability to
climate change. Burkina Faso’s economy is heavily dependent on the primary sector;
agro-pastoral and forestry activities occupy 86% of the population and account for a
significant percentage of the nation’s GDP.250 Unfavorable climatic conditions, including
poor soils and insufficient rainfall, make primary sector activities a challenge. In addition
to the climate-related stresses, Burkinabés struggle with technological and financial
constraints. As a result, the country often has trouble ensuring food security.
Analysis
The underlying reason for which the impacts of climate change are so
problematic for sub-Saharan Africa has to do with the vulnerability of the populations.
Natural hazards – flooding, drought, erosion, land degradation, and other effects of
climate change – do not directly cause problems such as food shortages and other
calamities. The effects of climate change and environmental degradation simply act as
trigger events, and turn into disasters when they hit vulnerable people.251 The causes of
vulnerability to climate change are often economic and political; many scholars believe
that inequality is the major basis for vulnerability.252 Poverty and vulnerability are not
synonymous, though there is a correlation between the two terms; poor people are often
exposed to more risks than the wealthy. Exposure to risk is the external side of
vulnerability, while the internal aspect consists of limited resilience and the inability to
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cope.253 Therefore, if a country truly wants to tackle the root causes of vulnerability to the
negative impacts of climate change, its NAPA should address the big picture. Rather than
limit priority adaptation activities to “tech fixes,” countries should expand their focus to
include social, political, and economic considerations – in short, state capacity. Why,
then, have countries such as Burkina Faso neglected to do this?
Like Tanzania, Burkina Faso’s NAPA lacks adaptation plans that are designed to
build state capacity. It appears as though Burkina Faso faces the same challenge as
Tanzania: ironically, it might not have the capacity to build capacity. The government is
weak, unable to maintain stability and to ensure security, including food security, for its
citizens, and the literacy and education levels are extremely low among Burkinabés.
Burkina Faso’s NAPA team seems at least somewhat aware of this problem, as it cited
lack of capacity as one of the potential barriers to NAPA implementation, and since
capacity was one of the criteria for the selection of priority activities. The actors
responsible for the development of the NAPA might have purposely selected adaptation
programs that do not focus on capacity, because it was apparent that the capacity to
implement such programs was missing at both the local and governmental levels. This
desire to provide adaptation strategies that do not require a great deal of capacity for
implementation relates to my hypothesis regarding the LDC’s own perception of
vulnerability. The NAPA objective specifies adaptation plans that address the immediate
needs of vulnerable populations. Women and farmers comprise some of the most
vulnerable populations to climate change in Burkina Faso, and the aim of the NAPA team
may have been to develop adaptation activities that are consistent with the existing
capabilities of these vulnerable groups. Perhaps most capacity-building plans were cut
253
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from the final prioritized list because of the low level of local capacity; vulnerable
populations would have had difficulties in implementing capacity-building adaptation
activities. The plan to improve energy efficiency in households, the only adaptation
activity in the NAPA that directly relates to capacity-building,254 ranked last on the
NAPA’s priority list and also was the most expensive adaptation activity.
As was the case for Tanzania, it appears as though the most significant reason that
Burkina Faso’s NAPA does not include capacity-building plans relates to the country’s
low level of development and the government’s low level of capacity. Land turnovers,
new agricultural policy, crop changes, and “individualization” that took place during the
colonial period disrupted the traditional functioning of Burkinabé society. The postcolonial Burkinabé government then mandated an additional change to land management
practices. It appears that Burkina Faso has yet to recover from these adjustments, as
Burkinabés continue to struggle with land degradation, land-related ethnic conflicts, and
food security issues. A weak economy requires Burkinabés to depend on the land for a
source of livelihood. The government’s low capacity to provide for Burkinabé citizens is
reflected in the country’s poor infrastructure. Burkina Faso’s government is not likely to
focus on capacity-building for climate change adaptation when it faces more pressing
challenges, such as providing for the day-to-day needs of the population.
Conclusion
Burkina Faso’s geography and dependence on the land for livelihood greatly
contribute to the country’s vulnerability to climate change. The study on the Kaya Region
reveals some of the climate-related challenges associated with living in an arid region,
including rainfall variability, soil degradation, drought, and famine. The Seno, Soum, and
254
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Oudalan Provinces illustrate how climatic variability can lead to conflicts between
farmers and herders, with resulting ethnic tensions. This region, in contrast to the Kaya,
also experiences damage from flooding, showing that the impacts of climate change are
varied even within a relatively small, landlocked country.
The NAPA of Burkina Faso adheres to the UNFCCC’s guidelines, in terms of
development process, structure, and content. The NAPA team did appear to pay
particular attention to the adaptation needs of poor rural populations, the country’s most
vulnerable groups. Most of the prioritized adaptation activities address agriculture and
water issues. Interestingly, one criterion for the selection of priority activities
concentrated on the capacity of local communities to implement the adaptation activities.
This indicates that Burkina Faso wished to avoid adaptation plans that not everyone could
implement, including the most vulnerable groups. Burkina Faso prioritizes adaptation
strategies that poor rural populations are able to follow. Therefore, I suggest that one
reason that capacity-building plans are excluded from the NAPA is that capacity-building
is not perceived as one of the most urgent adaptation needs; the Burkinabés believe that
they most urgently need adaptation plans that can be implemented by everyone.
Another significant explanation for the lack of capacity-building adaptation plans
has to do with Burkina Faso’s poorly-functioning government. Like Tanzania, the
colonial regime left Burkina Faso in a state of disarray. It appears as though the country
has yet to fully recover. The country is extremely underdeveloped, ranked 176th out of the
177 countries evaluated by the Human Development Report,255 and the government
struggles to provide its people with basic necessities such as peace and food. Therefore,

255

Human Development Report 2007/2008, Country Fact Sheets – Burkina Faso

85

the Burkina Faso’s weak state capacity limits the country’s ability to implement capacitybuilding plans as a part of its NAPA.
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V. Senegal
Overview of Senegal’s Vulnerabilities to Climate Change
Senegal is located on the western coast of Africa. Mauritania borders Senegal on
the north, Mali on the east, and Guinea and Guinea-Bissau on the south.256 Similar to the
previous two case study countries, Senegal is characterized by an arid climate,
vulnerability to rainfall variation, and a heavy dependence on natural resources. The
Senegalese realized the necessity of protecting the natural environment well before the
start of the NAPA process. According to Senegal’s strategic framework for NAPA
implementation, the NAPA has been designed to be compatible with existing national
environment and development plans. Senegal had already devised plans to combat
desertification, protect ecological zones, fight against invasive species, improve coastal
management, mitigate global warming, and achieve the Millennium Development
Goals.257 The NAPA aspires to complement these efforts, to conserve natural resources,
and to work towards sustainable development. Although the scholarly theories on
capacity-building suggest that capacity-building is an essential component to climate
change adaptation, Senegal’s NAPA does not include capacity-building plans in its final
prioritized list. I argue that the mention of capacity-building in Senegal’s NAPA reflects
the country’s perceptions of most urgent adaptation activities as well as the country’s
governmental situation.
There are seven agro-ecological zones in Senegal: river, Niayes, northern
groundnut basin, southern groundnut basin, sylvo-pastoral zone, Upper Casamance, and
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Lower and Middle Casamance.258 The number of different zones suggests that Senegal’s
geographical diversity is just as extensive as Tanzania’s. Population density in Senegal is
somewhat higher than in Tanzania, with 48 people per square kilometer. The country is
comprised of 10,165,314 inhabitants, and, as in Tanzania, the majority of the population
is young; 58% of the population is under 20 years old.259 Over half of the population is
educated, and nearly half is urban. Like many other African countries, Senegal
experiences a great deal of poverty, especially in rural areas. Over 60% of the active
population works as some type of farmer. This type of lifestyle is particularly vulnerable
to the effects of climate change.
Resources and livelihood in Senegal are greatly affected by climate, as in
Tanzania and Burkina Faso. Senegal’s primary environmental resources include water,
fish, wood, soil, and fauna. Climate change often results in rainfall variability and sealevel rise, which can lead to the degradation of marine ecosystems and soil quality. In
turn, damaged ecosystems and poor soils compromise the availability of most natural
resources. Water resources, agriculture, and coastal zones are the sectors the most heavily
impacted by climate change in Senegal.260 The activities that take place in these sectors
involve roughly 70% of the Senegalese population and strongly contribute to the
country’s GDP.261 Fishing and tourism, two other significant sectors in the Senegalese
economy, are impacted by climate change as well.
The majority of the Senegalese population depends heavily on natural resources
for their livelihoods. Common activities consist of agriculture, fruit growing, market
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gardening, livestock, poultry farming, fishing, seaport activities, and tourism.262 All of
these activities depend on climatic conditions. The Senegalese the most vulnerable to
climate change, therefore, are the people who partake in these activities.263 The category
of most vulnerable groups also includes women, even though primary sector occupations
are typically controlled by men. Women perform duties such as collecting water and
wood; tasks that become increasingly difficult as the effects of climate change intensify.
Climate change leads to a particular set of social, economic, and biophysical
consequences in each vulnerable sector. A table from Senegal’s NAPA clearly presents
these impacts:
Table 11: Risk and Vulnerable Zones264
Social
Consequence
Coastal Zones
Threats to
populations and
habitats
Agriculture
Drops in
agricultural yield,
increasing food
deficits (risk of food
insecurity)
Water Resources
Regression of water
resources, problems
of access
Tourism
Decline in GDP
Fishing

Disturbances in the
exploitation of
maritime resources

Economic
Consequence
Economic losses
(essentially coastal
industries)
Drop in revenues for
the majority of the
population

Biophysical
Consequence
Coastal erosion,
salinization, loss of
biodiversity
Loss of agricultural
land

Disturbances of
hydroelectric
programs
Direct and indirect
loss of jobs
Loss of revenue for
15% of the
population

Diminishment of
water quality, loss
of biodiversity
Loss of beaches
Loss of marine
biodiversity
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Prioritization of Activities
Criteria for the selection and prioritization of adaptation activities take into
account access to revenue, access to infrastructure, synergy with existing strategies and
plans, and cost.265 The NAPA team considers access to revenue and infrastructure as
indicators of poverty, which has become a significant factor in both the causes of
environmental degradation and vulnerability to environmental degradation. Senegal’s
NAPA classifies its priority adaptation plans by geographical zone, and ranks the plans
according to the aforementioned criteria. For the Zone Sud, adaptation activities include:
mangrove restoration (protecting, replanting); reforestation; utilizing crop varieties better
able to adapt to the changing climatic conditions; and diffusing information.266
Adaptation activities for the Zone Nord consist of reforestation, forest renewal and
maintenance; micro-irrigation; restoration of soil fertility; utilization of adaptive plant
species; management of water retention basins; and, again, the diffusion of
information.267 Activities for the Bassin arachidier involve reforestation; the preservation
of coastal zones; education; and hydro-agricultural management.268 Lastly, the activities
for the Zone de Niayes include dune fixation; reforestation; the protection of vulnerable
sites; information sharing; the promotion of water saving techniques; and the restoration
of underground water reserves.269 The NAPA provides a detailed list of specific
adaptation plans, including for each the context, description of activities, justification,
objectives, cost of activities (with totals in Senegalese currency and U.S. dollars), and the
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organizations responsible for the execution of the project.270 It is worth noting that, like
the adaptation activities in Tanzania’s and Burkina Faso’s NAPAs, these adaptation plans
do not address the need to build state capacity. Senegal’s adaptation strategies instead
focus heavily on physical and technical fixes, such as improving irrigation and planting
new crops.
Vulnerabilities and Adaptation Activities by Sector
As mentioned above, Senegal’s three most vulnerable sectors are water resources,
agriculture, and coastal zones. The vulnerabilities within the water sector are similar to
the water-related vulnerabilities described by Tanzania and Burkina Faso: rainfall
variability, droughts, flooding, and damage to agriculture and livestock. Senegal’s NAPA
team views its water problem in terms of development; for example, too much water is
lost in the sea is a result of insufficient retention infrastructure. A great deal of rainwater
reserves is lost as a consequence of ineffective water protection.271 Adaptation activities,
therefore, should focus on the improvement of water infrastructure and should include the
introduction of new water protection measures. Small-scale infrastructure, such as
hillside returns and retention basins, could replenish the hydrographic system.272 The
adaptation activities addressing the protection of available water reserves include: strict
control of the use of chemical products such as pesticides; maintaining the equilibrium
between the rate of extraction and the rate of water table renewal; improving the quality
of water discharge; the treatment of water where pollution has been detected; the
imposition of a sanitation plan on all habitation projects (graywater and blackwater
currently are the primary sources of groundwater pollution, because many areas do not
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have adequate sanitation); improved compliance with the rules for the protection of
hydraulic openings, the establishment of protection perimeters for water capture zones;
education, information sharing, and the formation of collectives.273 Though not included
in this section of Senegal’s NAPA, biomass – Africa’s most common energy source –
also affects water resources. As LDCs develop, energy demand will increase. Extensive
use of biomass exacerbates soil erosion and flooding.274 Tanzania and Burkina Faso have
developed adaptation strategies that are designed to implement alternative and renewable
energy sources in households. Senegal does not include this type of adaptation strategy in
its NAPA.
Climate change is predicted to affect Senegal’s agricultural sector in many of the
same ways that it will affect agriculture in Tanzania and Burkina Faso. Agriculture
constitutes the principal source of food, work, and income for rural communities in
Africa, and directly relates to hunger and poverty.275 Agricultural vulnerabilities are
strongly linked to precipitation, since agriculture depends heavily on rainfall.
Desertification and the long-term rainfall reduction have greatly damaged crops and
vegetation in the northern two-thirds of the country.276 Furthermore, an additional
consequence of climate change in Senegal is inter-annual rainfall variability.277
Precipitation is becoming increasingly difficult to predict, and cultivation therefore
becomes progressively more challenging.278
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It is argued that, in terms of responding to climate change, Africa’s most urgent
priority is to reverse the decline of agricultural yields.279 So far, agricultural
intensification has occurred mainly through territorial expansion instead of improved
agricultural techniques. Developing techniques for coping with irregular rainfall and
improving agricultural product distribution (currently hampered by the low purchasing
power of small-scale farmers) could increase food production without contributing to
environmental degradation.280 In Senegal, technology and research form the basis of the
NAPA’s adaptation strategies for the agricultural sector. Research-based adaptation
options include the fight against desertification, the improvement of the efficiency of
water usage in agriculture and industry, and the selection of plant species tolerant to
adverse climate conditions.281 Technological adaptation strategies consist of the diffusion
of agro-forestry techniques; the diversification of crops; the utilization of short-cycle crop
varieties; the utilization of salt-tolerant crops; water collection and management; the
extension of community woods; brush fire prevention programs; the dissemination of
fertilization techniques; the reorganization of growing systems, the implementation of
rural early warning systems; and an institutional push. This last technology-based
adaptation strategy aims to boost the consideration of climate change science in the
formation of policy decisions and to reinforce analytical capacities.282 Neither Burkina
Faso nor Tanzania makes any direct reference to improving state capacity as part of an
adaptation plan; Senegal’s inclusion of such a plan is significant.

279

Davidson et al., pp. S105-S106
Davidson et al., pp. S105-S106
281
Senegal NAPA, p. 21
282
Senegal NAPA, p. 21
280

93

Like Tanzania, part of Senegal’s geography is comprised of coastal areas that will
be greatly impacted by climate change. One climate change scenario predicts a global
mean sea level rise of 88 cm within this century.283 Most impacts of sea-level rise are
likely to be indirect, such as changes in water supply, agricultural productivity, and
human migration.284 Other indirect effects of sea-level rise are changes in erosion
patterns; damage to coastal infrastructure; salinization of well-water; loss of coastal
ecosystems and resources; and damage to the sewage systems of coastal cities, with
adverse consequences for human health.285 According to the NAPA, vulnerabilities for
Senegal’s coastal zones include floods, erosion, salinization of waters and soils, and
mangrove degradation. Floods are a recurring phenomenon, and can be particularly
problematic in urban areas.286 Coastal erosion also threatens urban developments.287
Rates of retreating coastlines vary, but the average for sandy beaches is between 1 and 2
meters per year.288 Many cities in Senegal are located along the coast. One study ranked
Senegal 45th most vulnerable to sea-level rise out of 181 countries.289
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Table 6: Principal physical impacts and consequences of climate change on coastal and
marine zones290
Principal physical impacts
Expected consequences
Sea-level rise
Increase in coastal erosion
Flooding of low coastal zones
Salinization of water and soils
Risk of mangrove disappearance
Increase in wave heights
Increase in coastal erosion
Warming of ocean waters
Changes in the structure and composition
of marine species (fish and water birds)
Development of toxic agents in marine
animals
Modification of upwellings
Changes in the structure and composition
of marine communities

Senegal’s adaptation options for the coastal zone appear to be more sophisticated
and comprehensive than Tanzania’s and Burkina Faso’s adaptation strategies. The NAPA
includes technological options, natural resource options (the protection of certain
ecosystems, such as mangroves), legal and institutional options, and capacity-based
options.291 Burkina Faso’s and Tanzania’s NAPAs do not characterize adaptation actions
as institutional or capacity-based. Senegal’s NAPA team acknowledged that technologybased adaptation strategies are not always sufficient or appropriate. Legal and
institutional options included a redefinition of the notion of public maritime domain;
regulations concerning beach sands, permits, and environmental impact studies; and the
formation of an institutional body to be in charge of the surveillance of coastal zones. The
capacity-based options mentioned the need to strengthen the capacity of institutional
actors (government ministries, decentralized structures, urban and rural communities),
and the need for adequate information for decision-makers.292
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NAPA Methodology
Senegal developed its NAPA in five phases and eight stages. The phases were:
global organization, sectoral studies, public consultations, prioritization, and project
formulation.293 The first two stages consisted of assembling the multidisciplinary NAPA
team. The second two stages included a synthesis of impact studies, adaptation strategies,
anterior consultations, and existing development frameworks; and a rapid participative
evaluation of the current vulnerability and the potential intensification of climate-related
risks. The fifth stage was a public consultation, with the goal of identifying potential
adaptation activities. In stage six, priority criteria were developed in light of the outcome
of the public consultation. The next stage a classification of adaptation activities and a
demonstration of their integration with existing national development plans. The final
stage included an elaboration of project profiles and, finally, the submission of the NAPA
to the Senegalese government.294
In a sense, Senegal seems more conscious of its weaknesses concerning
vulnerability assessment and adaptation than Tanzania. Senegal’s NAPA team included a
section on limitations of the methodology in the NAPA document. The main limitation
perceived by the NAPA team involved the organization of the public consultations and
the prioritization of adaptation strategies. The NAPA team felt that the results of the
public consultation were strongly tied to the feelings and knowledge of the people present
– perhaps suggesting that the biased views of the consultation’s participants did not lead
to the most accurate representation of the country’s climate situation. In terms of
prioritizing adaptation plans, the NAPA team reflected that decisions were based on
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people, subject to human limitations, rather than scientific models. The outcome of the
prioritization decisions, then, depended on the preferences, experiences, and knowledge
of the involved actors. The selection of priority activities was the result of achieving
consensus, not optimization.295
Analysis
Overall, Senegal’s NAPA seems more advanced than the NAPAs of Tanzania and
Burkina Faso. Senegal elected to organize its entire NAPA by sector, and then presented
vulnerabilities and adaptation options within each sector. Senegal’s document includes
more scientific data, graphs, charts, and tables. The Senegalese NAPA team recognizes
the importance of institutions and capacities. The adaptation plans appear to be more
comprehensive and detailed when compared to the NAPAs of Tanzania and Burkina
Faso. While the Senegalese NAPA, like the others studied, does not include adaptation
strategies that specifically focus on capacity-building, capacity is clearly taken into
consideration by the NAPA team. Senegal’s NAPA team distinguishes between different
types of capacity, states that technical capacity is not always sufficient, and recognizes
the importance of institutions having the capacity to carry out their tasks.
Some scientists argue that African climate change strategies should take a
“development first” approach.296 Low levels of development are often cited as barriers to
effective adaptation to climate change impacts. Furthermore, it is perceived that climate
change will hinder the achievement of many of the Millennium Development Goals.
Proponents of the “development first” approach believe that future climate strategies
should emphasize development plans with subsidiary climate benefits, and should work
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to increase the country’s capacity to implement these plans.297 Development is
particularly important in terms of capacity, since a country’s ability to increase its
capacity to deal with the impacts of climate change strongly depends on the country’s
overall ability to develop.298 The capability to develop refers to carrying out the general
tasks of the nation state, including problem-solving, and setting and realizing
objectives.299 Common barriers to development consist of inappropriate infrastructure,
poorly-functioning markets, and weak institutions.300 The agricultural sector provides an
example of the link between poor markets and underdevelopment: thanks to agricultural
research, technologies exist to enhance agricultural production levels. However, farmers
have not been able to implement these technologies due to a lack of markets and
economic incentives.301
The market system may be one reason why LDCs lack comprehensive climate
change strategies. Many African developing countries and LDCs are in the midst of an
economic transition. The role of the state becomes less and less significant as countries
liberalize state enterprises and open markets to international investments.302
Consequently, governments are finding that their reach has diminished in an increasingly
market-oriented context. As governments are obliged to focus their attention on a smaller
number of priority issues, climate change often takes the back seat.303
A “Development and Climate” project, involving Senegal and other West African
countries, was started in 2002. The goals of this project focused on policies that
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simultaneously meet development priorities and address climate change issues; long-term
sustainable development; and integrated development and climate strategies.304 The
NAPA teams of Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Senegal do attempt to demonstrate the
NAPA’s compatibility with existing national development plans. Senegal’s NAPA
addresses capacity more than the other two, and even proposes capacity-building plans as
a response to climate-related vulnerabilities in the agricultural and coastal sectors.
However, as I have demonstrated throughout this study, none of the three NAPAs contain
priority adaptation strategies that include capacity-building plans. It is encouraging,
though, that Senegal’s NAPA team has so clearly stated the need to increase capacity.
Senegal is the site of an innovative project with encouraging implications for
African agriculture. From the 1970s onward, sub-Saharan Africa has undergone severe
droughts, a 30-40% reduction in rainfall, falling groundwater tables, and soil degradation.
The Sebikotane region of Senegal experiences the added stress of strong coastal winds
that blow away topsoil.305 A pilot farm in the Sebikotane has demonstrated that it is
possible to “produce” a new environment that is more hospitable to agriculture. New
agroforestry techniques on the pilot farm have become models for the reversal of
desertification, the increase of agricultural production, and the subsequent increase of
revenue. Trees are planted in dense perennial hedges, so that they serve as windbreaks. It
is easier for crops to grow when they are planted in soils that are protected from the wind.
The use of trees as windbreaks also provides a readily-available source of wood for
cooking, and thus decreases the fuel-collection time and effort for women and girls. Drip
irrigation replaces water-intensive and rain-fed agricultural practices. The pilot farm has
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experienced a great deal of success. Farmers who have passed through the pilot farm
have introduced many of the farm’s techniques in their own communities.306
Long-term strategies such as the transition to sustainable farming are promoted by
Moussa Seck of the Senegalese NGO Environnement et Developpement du Tiers-Monde
(EDNA-TM). Seck asserts that it is essential to think in the long-term, and that the threeto five-year duration of most adaptation programs is insufficient.307 The time frame of
projects is often a point of contention. The development and adaptation efforts of many
LDCs tend to be focused on the short-term; long-term impacts of climate change are not
priorities when people are concerned with their ability to sustain themselves on a day-today basis.308
As well as integration with development plans, a climate change response should
give considerable attention to food production, water scarcity, wood demand, and
electricity. Because of population growth, food production will need to double over the
next quarter century; however, climate change decreases agricultural productivity. Within
30 years, populations facing water scarcity will double, yet climate change decreases
water availability. Wood demand is also expected to double in the foreseeable future, but
climate change makes forest management increasingly difficult as a consequence of pests
and fires. Finally, electricity demand in developing countries will increase three to five
times over the next several decades.309 Since burning fossil fuel exacerbates climate
change, clean energy alternatives will need to be developed and implemented.
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A country’s government, typically the ministry of the environment or a
meteorological services department, ultimately holds the responsibility for the
development and implementation national climate change activities. A lack of state
capacity, therefore, can significantly hinder the country’s ability to come up with an
effective adaptation plan. The group in charge of developing the adaptation plan – in this
case, the NAPA team – must conduct research, modeling, and analysis, and must
coordinate between different government ministries.310 Often, government personnel
struggle to find the time to participate in climate change studies. Furthermore, the multidisciplinary nature of climate change can mean that an adaptation study implicates
several different government ministries, each with different perceptions and priorities.
The need to cooperate across ministries makes it “difficult to collect data, perform
analysis and build meaningful capacity across ministerial borders… The realities of
government departments can inhibit the process of carrying out the study and building
capacity among staff.”311
Examination of Hypotheses
Does Senegal’s NAPA truly reflect the country’s vulnerabilities to climate
change? If the NAPA team did not identify the lack of capacity as a vulnerability, there
would be no reason for the NAPA to include capacity-building strategies. I argue that the
NAPA does adequately reflect Senegal’s climate-related vulnerabilities, as identified by
both the NAPA team and other scholars. Senegal’s NAPA clearly recognizes the
country’s need for capacity, and goes so far as to propose adaptation strategies with a
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capacity-building focus for the agriculture and coastal zone sectors, even though these
plans do not make it onto the final prioritized list.
Does Senegal have the capacity to develop capacity-building adaptation plans?
Ironically, many LDCs lack the capacity to build capacity. Since their independence,
Tanzania and Burkina Faso have struggled to maintain peace and order; it is likely that
the governments of these countries are so preoccupied with the effort to perform basic
duties that they are unable to build state capacity to address the impacts of climate
change. As the case in Tanzania and Burkina Faso, none of Senegal’s final priority
adaptation plans focus on capacity-building. However, Senegal’s NAPA does pay a
remarkable amount of attention to the need for capacity, especially when compared with
the other two countries. Also in contrast to Tanzania and Burkina Faso, Senegal’s
transition to independence occurred unusually smoothly. I argue that the correlation
between government stability and capacity helps to explain the absence of capacitybuilding plans in the NAPAs of these LDCs; Senegal’s NAPA addresses capacity more
than the other countries, and Senegal’s government has also been more stable.
Tony Chafer argues that since its independence from the French colonial rule,
“Senegal’s close ties to France have contributed to its political stability.”312 Senegal was
among France’s oldest colonies, and has enjoyed a mutually profitable relationship with
its former colonizer. Leopold Sédar Senghor, who became president when Senegal
gained its independence in 1960, was a devout Francophile and ensured that his country
had a smooth, successful start while maintaining cooperation with France. Senghor
“earned a reputation as an enlightened African leader who bequeathed to his country
stability, a relatively open society with a vigorous free press, and a functioning
312
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democracy.”313 Senegal’s ongoing bond with France helped to ensure this stability.
France’s military aided the Senegalese government in a time when nationalist groups
showed signs of uprising. Additionally, the fact that Senegal continued to use the French
franc as its currency encouraged French educators and government advisors to take posts
in the former colony.314
By the time Senegal’s third president came to power, the special rapport with
France had begun to deteriorate. France experienced problems dealing with illegal
Senegalese immigrants, and Senegal’s President Abdoulaye Wade worked to expand
foreign relations to the United Kingdom, the United States, and other countries in
Africa.315 However, the close ties with France immediately following decolonization
allowed Senegal to commence its independence with a stable economy, and a relatively
peaceful population, and a remarkably well-functioning government.
As a result of its historical/governmental situation, Senegal fares better than
Tanzania and Burkina Faso in terms of having the capacity to develop capacity-building
adaptation strategies. However, it is important to note that while capacity-building plans
were initially proposed in Senegal’s NAPA, the plans did not make it to the final list of
priority activities. This indicates that, while the Senegalese recognized their need for
improved capacity, they viewed other types of adaptation strategies as more appropriate
for the NAPA. Therefore, even though Senegal’s government appears to have more
extant capacity than the other two governments, Senegal would still benefit from
capacity-building.
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According to the Environmental Sustainability Index, Senegal has higher levels of
environmental health and environmental governance than Tanzania and Burkina Faso.
However, in the broad category of social and institutional capacity, Tanzania fared
slightly better than Senegal, though Senegal did achieve a higher score than Burkina
Faso. Senegal’s score for the science and technology indicator is also somewhere
between the scores for Tanzania and Burkina Faso.316 Clearly, none of the three countries
excels in terms of environmental sustainability and climate change adaptation. Although
Senegal has achieved better government stability than either Tanzania or Burkina Faso, it
is still an LDC, and is ranked 156th out of the 177 countries investigated by the Human
Development Report.317 Furthermore, Senegal’s adult literacy rate is only 39.3%318
(hence the great number of proposed adaptation projects that include an
educational/information-sharing component). The fact that Senegal’s HDR ranking and
overall ESI scores are comparable to the other two countries suggests that, despite its
better functioning government, Senegal still has a great deal of room for progress.
Conclusion
Overall, Senegal’s situation supports the hypotheses that the NAPAs of LDCs in
sub-Saharan Africa do not include capacity-building plans because of the countries’ own
perceptions of vulnerability and, more importantly, because of the low levels of existing
state capacity. Unlike Tanzania and Burkina Faso, Senegal includes a significant amount
of capacity-related information in its NAPA. Although capacity-building plans did not
make it onto the final prioritized list of activities, it is apparent that Senegal’s NAPA
team was fully aware of the need for capacity, as well as the distinction between
316
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technology-based and capacity-based adaptation plans. The NAPA team was also
cognizant of the country’s limitations in both developing and implementing its NAPA.
This increased awareness of capacity, in comparison to the other two countries examined
in this report, can be attributed to Senegal’s relatively higher development status. The
Human Development Report ranked Senegal 20 countries higher than Burkina Faso, and
3 countries higher than Tanzania.319 Furthermore, unlike the other countries, Senegal’s
colonial experience and subsequent transition to independence resulted in stability and a
well-functioning democracy. As a result, the Senegalese government has more capacity
to provide for the basic needs of the Senegalese population, and the country is several
steps closer to developing capacity-building for adaptation to climate change. Even
though Senegal would still benefit from capacity-building activities as part of a response
to climate change, the fact that Senegal at least explores capacity-building in its NAPA
demonstrates that the country is closer to implementing capacity-building activities than
the other two countries.
I argue that, ultimately, the omission of capacity-building in the NAPA’s final list
of priority activities can be attributed to Senegal’s perceptions of urgency and local
feasibility. The NAPA team clearly demonstrates an awareness of capacity-building
strategies, and the country appears to have a higher degree of existing capacity than either
Burkina Faso or Tanzania. Therefore, it seems as though Senegal would be able to
develop effective capacity-building strategies if need be, and has elected instead to put
forth adaptation strategies that are more technology-based, designed for implementation
directly by the groups the most vulnerable to climate change.
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VI. Conclusion
This thesis addressed the lack of capacity-building in the climate change
adaptation plans of sub-Saharan African least-developed countries. My focus was on state
capacity, the technical and intellectual capability of governments to develop and
implement adaptation strategies. I opened the study with a background on the impacts of
climate change on sub-Saharan Africa. I also presented an explanation of the National
Adaptation Program of Action (NAPA) rationale and development process, and an
overview of theories on capacity-building. In order to ascertain why the NAPAs of
African LDCs did not include prioritized adaptation activities that emphasized capacitybuilding, I analyzed the climate-related vulnerabilities and NAPA content of three case
study countries, investigated the countries’ current levels of state capacity, and sought
explanations for my findings in the countries’ historical backgrounds. The Environmental
Sustainability Index and the Human Development Report provided useful indicators of
existing capacity, including science and technology, institutions, education and literacy
rates, and economic situations.
I have demonstrated that capacity-building adaptation plans are missing from the
NAPAs of three least-developed countries in sub-Saharan Africa. I selected Tanzania,
Burkina Faso, and Senegal as case studies because each has a slightly varied set of
climate-related vulnerabilities and a different level of existing state capacity. According
to the theories of Connolly, Keohane, Levy, and Haas, capacity is an important
component of adaptation to climate change. Countries require state capacity in order to
identify adaptation needs, to obtain and evaluate information necessary for the
formulation of an adaptation strategy, and to develop and implement the strategy itself.
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LDCs typically lack state capacity; oftentimes, governments barely have the capacity to
perform the basic tasks expected of a nation-state. Most African LDCs have “not yet
succeeded in bringing either stability or coherent development to the region.” 320 The fact
that these countries experience a deficiency in state capacity, an element so valuable in
terms of adaptation to climate change, led me to seek an explanation for why capacitybuilding plans are not included in the NAPAs.
My hypotheses addressed the question of why the NAPAs of African LDCs have
generally failed to include capacity-building in their lists of prioritized adaptation
activities. I argued that two major factors help to explain the lack of capacity-building
plans in the NAPAs of sub-Saharan Africa. First of all, it could be that the countries
simply – and ironically – lack the capacity to build capacity. Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and
Senegal all recognized the value of capacity at some point in their NAPAs; yet, in all
three NAPAs, the prioritized lists of adaptation activities do not lead to an increase in
state capacity. The adaptation activities appear to be designed for implementation at all
levels of society, including the groups the most vulnerable to the impacts of climate
change. The most vulnerable groups consist of poor, rural populations that, incidentally,
have the least amount of capacity to implement adaptation programs. Since NAPAs are
intended to respond to a country’s immediate and urgent adaptation needs, and since the
NAPAs of Tanzania, Burkina Faso, and Senegal demonstrated an awareness of the
importance of capacity, it appears that the LDCs did not consider capacity-building to be
as high a priority as other adaptation activities that the most vulnerable groups would be
able to implement. The fact that rural groups in particular have such low levels of
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capacity reflects the weak state capacity of the LDCs in general. This leads to my next
hypothesis.
In my second hypothesis, I argued that LDCs’ low levels of existing state capacity
correspond in part to the countries’ colonial legacies. All three countries examined in this
report are former European colonies. The United Kingdom controlled Tanzania until
1964, Burkina Faso was a colony of France until 1946, and Senegal gained independence
from the French colonial authorities in 1960. Since their independence, Tanzania and
Burkina Faso have suffered from instability, corruption, and poorly-functioning
governments – conditions that simultaneously contribute to and are exacerbated by
environmental degradation. Tanzania and Burkina Faso do not explore capacity-building
issues in any type of depth in their NAPAs, and both countries cite lack of capacity as a
barrier to NAPA implementation. Senegal, on the other hand, experienced a remarkably
smooth transition to independence, and managed to sustain close ties with France. The
former colonizer helped the Senegalese government to ensure stability during threats of
uprising, and also provided expertise in the form of teachers and military and technical
advisors. This helps to explain why Senegal’s government has more existing state
capacity than the governments of Tanzania and Burkina Faso. Senegal’s government is
better able to provide for its population and to execute institutional reforms, and therefore
better equipped to develop capacity-building adaptation plans. Senegal’s NAPA
differentiates between the capacity to strengthen institutional actors and the capacity of
decision-makers to procure and interpret relevant information, and includes proposals to
increase these types of capacity.
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The absence of capacity-building plans in the NAPAs is significant; the UNFCCC
intended the NAPAs to be the major mechanism for adaptation to climate change in
LDCs, and if state capacity is necessary for effective adaptation, then additional
adaptation procedures must be devised. Because a number of LDCs lack the capacity to
build capacity, outside assistance may be required. Sub-Saharan Africa will be
particularly affected by climate change, and LDCs in this region are especially vulnerable
to climate change’s impacts. It is essential that all adaptation requirements of LDCs be
addressed, as the world has committed itself to a changing climate well into the future.
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